Sub-Saharan Africa and the Market Economy  A Way Forward by Runsewe, Babafemi.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2008-03













Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA AND THE MARKET ECONOMY: 









 Thesis Co-Advisors:   Letitia Lawson 
























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including 
the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and 
completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any 
other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington 
headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 
1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project 
(0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE  
March 2008 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE:  Sub-Saharan Africa and the Market Economy: A Way 
Forward 
6. AUTHOR(S) Babafemi Runsewe 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING 
ORGANIZATION REPORT 
NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
     AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official 
policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
The thesis examines what economic policies are most suited for African countries in the light of the poor economic 
performances over the years.  Policy prescriptions have varied from the state getting actively involved in the economy by 
shaping and directing to allowing the economy shape itself.  The regional framework, New Partnership for African 
Development, accords recognition to the efficacy of the market shaping itself.  However, differences remain on the 
involvement of the state and role of the market.  This study aims to provide answers to this through a comparative examination 
of successful ad unsuccessful economic cases  
In the case studies, none of the argument was sufficient alone to improve economic growth and development.  While 
the market facilitated growth in some sectors, it was state involvement that exploited and facilitated growth in others. The 
growth in instances the state intervened was sustained by market-friendly policies and short-term interventions.   It is also 
obvious that growth id dependent on the nature, competence and independence of a state’s bureaucracy. 
Overall, the paper concludes that a blend of improved planning and opening of the market guarantees economic 




15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
105 
14. SUBJECT TERMS  Sub-Sahara Africa, Liberalization, Structural Adjustment, 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 




Lieutenant Colonel, Nigerian Army 




Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES 











Author:  Babafemi Runsewe 
 
 










Harold A. Trinkunas 





























This thesis examines the economic policies most suited for African countries in 
light of the poor economic performances over the years.  Policy prescriptions have varied 
from the government taking active roles in fashioning and directing the economy to 
allowing the economy to shape itself through the forces of demand and supply.  The 
regional framework for economic development, New Partnership for African 
Development, accords some recognition to the efficacy of forces of demand and supply. 
However, some fundamental differences remain in the involvement of the state and role 
of the market.  This study aims to provide answers to this through a comparative 
examination of successful and unsuccessful economic cases.   
In the case studies, none of the approaches was sufficient alone to improve 
economic growth and development.  While the market exploited and facilitated growth in 
some sectors, it was state involvement that facilitated growth in others. The growth in 
instances the state intervened was sustained by market-friendly policies and short term 
involvement.   It was also obvious that success is dependent on the nature, competence 
and independence of a state’s bureaucracy. 
Overall, this paper concludes that a blend of improved planning and management 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE 
Between 1960 and 1973, the economies of countries making up the Third World 
were almost on par with one another.  During this period, the average annual growth rate 
in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) was 2.9% and peaked at 11%.1  This performance was 
comparable to that in South East Asia and Latin America and was largely driven by 
agriculture and manufacturing.  However, by the mid 1970s, while the economies of 
South East Asian countries continued to grow, those of SSA and Latin America began to 
decline.  This was most pronounced in Africa where the gross domestic product (GDP) 
growth fell from 2.08% in 1975 to 1.36% in 1990.2  This was unlike the countries in 
South East Asia, whose total GDP growth rose from 1.7% in 1975 to 2.09% in 1990.3  
However, in spite of the general decline in economic performance, a few African 
countries continued to experience economic growth.  These included Mauritius, 
Botswana, Kenya and Zimbabwe. 
Owing to poor economic performance, the Bretton Woods institutions began 
advising and encouraging poorly performing developing countries to embark on neo-
liberal economic reforms in the early 1980s.  These reforms included liberalization of the 
market, devaluation of currency and reduction of government budget deficit amongst 
other things.  The aim was to open up the local market for competition and encourage an 
export drive which, it was believed would stimulate the local economy.  While the 
reforms were successful in a few countries, including Ghana, Mozambique and Uganda, 
the reverse was the case for most of SSA.4  Some assessments attributed this general  
 
 
                                                  
1 Michael Chege,” Sub-Sahara Africa: Under-development’s Last Stand,” in Global Change, Regional 
Response: The New International Context of Development, ed. Barbara Stallings (NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), 318. 
2 Ibid, Also, Morten Jerven, “Regression in Africa Growth- A Review of the Method and the 
Evidence” (paper for the EH 590, London School of Economics, April 2007), 4. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Chege, “Sub-Sahara Africa,” 309. 
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failure to the reforms themselves, while others argued that internal factors (the inability 
or unwillingness of governments to create an enabling environment, corruption, poor 
infrastructure, etc.) were the chief cause.5 
At the same time, the advent of the ‘Internet’ and the quickening of globalization 
after the triumph of capitalism over socialism with the fall of the USSR were to increase 
trade and development among the developed and newly industrialized countries. Some 
developing countries explored the opportunities created by this diffusion of information, 
technology and the growing inter-dependence to improve their contributions to global 
trade.  Unlike other regions, Africa’s contribution in these areas remained insignificant, 
leading to the further marginalization of the region.6  Its only contribution has been the 
supply of raw materials, while much of Asia and Latin America now contribute 
manufactured goods and services to the globalized economy. The purpose of this 
research, therefore, is to examine why some economies were successful in the region, and 
then to explore the options available for the rest of SSA in light of these experiences and 
the differing prescriptions offered by the Bretton Woods institutions and African regional 
experts. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
The continuous marginalization of SSA from the global market owing to her 
inability to contribute meaningfully is a source of concern not only to the continent, but 
to the world at large.  For instance, while the standard of living in much of the rest of the 
world has improved, the reverse is the case in Africa, threatening human security and 
thus regional and international security.  The experience of the successful economies 
such as Botswana, Mauritius and Cape Verde is a lesson for the rest of sub-Sahara Africa.  
Recent events elsewhere have no doubt revealed that economic growth and development  
 
 
                                                 
5 Thomas Callaghy,” Between Scylla and Charybdis: The Foreign Economic Relations of Sub-Saharan 
African States,” in Africa: Dilemmas of Development and Change, ed. Peter Lewis (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1998), 382. 
6 Charles Soludo and Osita Ogbu, “A Synthesis of Major Themes in the Political Economy of Trade 
and Industrialization in Africa,” in The Politics of Trade and Industrial Policy in Africa- Forced 
Consensus?, ed. Charles Soludo, Ha-Joon Chang  and Micheal Ogbu (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 
2004), 1; and Kidane Mengisteab, Globalization and Autocentricity in Africa’s Development in the 21st 
Century (Trenton: Africa World Press, 1996), 17.  
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thrive as countries adopt democratic and liberal economic values with good planning 
amongst others.  This is further enhanced through globalization for the ultimate benefit of 
the country and its people.  
The need to develop the region becomes imperative considering the fact that the 
region has experienced most of the world’s conflicts in recent years.  These conflicts are 
largely attributed to economic causes, including: low economic growth and opportunities, 
reliance on the export of primary commodities, etc.7  This is further compounded by the 
fact that the probability of conflicts is higher in countries that have been embroiled in one 
in the past.8  Thus, it is imperative that the region develop to grow the economy and 
reduce the probability of more conflict. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Major Debates on Development in Africa 
The debates on development in SSA center on the policies adopted by 
governments over the years.  These debates revolve around neo-liberal and state 
interventionist policies.  The neo-liberals attribute the failures of most African economies 
to the state interventionist policies adopted at independence.  In particular, they note that 
the policies, rather than boost agricultural and industrial growth which were essential to 
economic performance, undermined the potentials therein.9 On agriculture, they assert 
that marketing boards and price control mechanisms rather than encouraging rural 
farmers to increase production, resulted in low earnings for the farmers, and a drift from 
rural to urban areas.10  This is attributed to the practice of under pricing agricultural 
produce for the urban consumers while utilizing surpluses from agricultural produce to 
finance the industrial sector to the detriment of the agricultural sector.11  In addition, they 
                                                 
7 Paul Collier, “Africa Growth: Why a ‘Big Push?” Journal of African Economics 15, Supplement 2 
(2006): 191-192. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Adebayo Olukoshi, “Democratization, Globalization and Effective Policy Making in Africa,” in The 
Politics of Trade and Industrial Policy in Africa- Forced Consensus? ed. Charles Soludo, Ha-Joon Chang  
and Michael Ogbu (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2004), 4. 
10 Ibid. 
11 John Rapley, Understanding Development: Theory and Practice in the Third World (Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Rienner, 1996), 43; and Francis Nyamnjoh and Ignasio Jimu, “Success or Failure of Developmental 
State in Africa: Exploration of the Development Experiences in a Global Context,” in The Potentiality of 
‘Developmental States’ in Africa, Botswana and Uganda Compared, ed. Pamela Mbabazi and Ian Taylor 
(Dakar: Senegal, CODESRIA, 2005), 21. 
4 
note that the design of an import-substitution-industrialization (ISI) strategy was 
responsible for poor industrial growth.  They claim the strategy relied on foreign capital 
and, instead of driving exports, resulted in the alteration of the economic output of 
countries in ways that ultimately did not improve the economy.12  One of the 
shortcomings observed in the strategy was the use of locally generated foreign exchange 
to finance the importation of inputs and spare parts for industries, which had amongst 
other things, led to the stifling of the development of a local capitalist class.13  In 
addition, they note that in instances where ISI propelled exports, it was to neighboring 
countries and not to the developed economies.  Kenya’s trade with its neighbors is cited 
as an example in this regard.  
Underpinning these economic choices, the school asserts that the array of 
subsides, governments’ part-ownership of ISIs, tariffs, high exchange rates and protective 
measures created avenues for rent-seeking, patronage and corruption which bedeviled the 
political class, regulatory bodies, bureaucracy and society at large.14  Further, they opine 
that a lack of political empowerment and development of the populace allowed the self-
serving African elite to continue the colonial practice of using the state to extract wealth 
for personal gain. The net effect of which was a downturn in the fortune of state-owned 
industries, non-competitiveness of the industrial sector, inefficiency in the bureaucracy 
and a decline in public goods and services.15  In addition, lack of accountability and the 
authoritarian and paternalistic nature of most African states are seen as both causes and 
effects of the policies adopted.16   
After a decade of neo-liberal Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), the state 
interventionist school took up the position of critic.  The criticism of neo-liberalism 
included the failure of SAP policies to take cognizance of the role of external factors in 
their design, the abandonment of the concept of nation-building, which was paramount in 
                                                 
12 Rapley, Understanding Development, 39. 
13 Ibid., 32-33; and Mengisteab, Globalization and Autocentricity, 137. 
14 Thandika Mkandawire and Charles Soludo, An African Perspective on Structural Adjustment: Our 
Continent Our Future (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1999), 25. 
15 Rapley, Understanding Development, 44. 
16 Mengisteab, Globalization and Autocentricity, 134-135; and Mbabazi and Taylor, The Potentiality, 
22. 
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the design of the intervention strategy adopted at independence, and the “elevation of 
rent-seeking and neo-patrimonialism to the status of a conceptual deus ex machina which 
explained everything that went wrong.”17  Another criticism of the neo-liberal policy was 
its assumption that any active state role was detrimental or hostile to the private sector, 
and the discrediting of the state has a player in the development of a state. The school 
notes that external constraints such as unfavorable terms of trade and large external debt 
burdens were important contributors to the failure of development in countries of the 
region.  Furthermore, they assert that some of the rents that neo-liberal policy frowned 
upon were integral to the development of capital accumulation and thus a distinction 
ought to have been made between productive and unproductive rents.18  In this regard 
they argue that rent-seeking ought not to have been conflated with corruption, patron-
client relationship and the extended family system.19  In addition, they opine that the 
protective barriers such as tariffs, licenses, and import restrictions that the neo-liberals 
sought to remove served multiple objectives which were necessary considering states’ 
low revenue bases and late entry into the global economy. 
The most criticized aspect of the Structural Adjustment policy was the relegation 
to the background of local politicians, bureaucrats and policy makers in the search for 
solutions by the BWI and the implementation of the policy.  The school argues that the 
imposition of the policy through conditionalities and the discrediting of local politicians, 
policy makers and bureaucrats doomed the policy from its inception, largely because 
there was no domestic consensus to guarantee local ownership and sustainability.20  
Furthermore, they argue that some of the policies condemned in Africa were successfully 
utilized in Asia, the difference being the means of financing industrialization.21 The 
group gives credence to their arguments with the tacit admittance by the BWI of the 
inadequacies of the policies.22  This, they claim, was buttressed by the poor performance 
of the economies of most SSA by the end of the decade. 
                                                 
17 Olukoshi, “Democratization,” 7; and Mkandawire and Soludo, An African Perspective, 27. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Mkandawire and Soludo, An African Perspective, 26; and Olukoshi, “Democratization,” 9. 
21 Ibid., 32, 34. 
22 Rapley, Understanding Development, 119. 
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Each school supports its claim largely with quantitative analysis of economic 
indicators for the continent as a whole.  This approach masks the significant variation 
within the continent, in policy, performance and local ownership.  Therefore, this thesis 
will adopt a comparative case study approach in order to bring new evidence to bear on 
this long standing debate. 
2. A Major Question 
The tacit acceptance by African leaders of the neo-liberal agenda in the New 
Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) and the World Bank’s ostensible 
acceptance of the importance of local ownership have created something of a consensus 
on the development policy for the first time in three decades.  However, differences 
remain.  While the AU and Africa specialists are now more favorably disposed to 
improving public planning and management based upon their readings of the East Asian 
success stories,23 the BWI remain focused on economic openness of the economy based 
on different readings of successes in the new industrializing countries of Asia. In 
particular, the AU and regional specialists are of the position that while the economy is 
driven by the market, the state should play a significant role in guiding and developing 
the economy.24  The BWI, however, remain committed to the economy being driven by 
the market with minimal government involvement.  
This thesis seeks to address this debate about whether improved planning and 
management, a further opening of the economy or a nuanced combination of the two is 
most likely to contribute to economic growth and development in Africa.  Accordingly, 
the effect of the public sector, its roles and policies on the development of the agricultural 
and industrial sectors will be examined. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
To address the objective of the study, this thesis will examine the cases of 
Botswana, Nigeria and Malaysia.  A comparison between the successful and unsuccessful 
cases will be made to ascertain what went right and what went wrong.  Botswana was 
chosen because it is one of the few successes in Africa with an estimated 2006 GDP per 
                                                 
23 New Partnership for African Development Framework Document, 
http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/homes.php (accessed March 12, 2008; Olukoshi, “Democratization,” 25; 
Mengisteab, Globalization and Autocentricity, 185; and Mkandawire and Soludo, An African Perspective, 96-100. 
24 Ibid. 
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capita of about $10,900.25  Among other things, it presents a fairly good representation of 
most African countries in terms of colonial legacies.   Furthermore, it started as a primary 
product exporter (of cattle and later diamonds), with a low GDP at independence.  
Malaysia was chosen largely because it is one of the relatively successful cases in South 
East Asia, having a GDP per capita of about $12,900.26  Furthermore, like most African 
societies, it is multi-ethnic, started as a mono-crop economy and has diversified its 
economy, thus substantially improving the economy. Nigeria was chosen because the 
outcomes of their development efforts have not been successful, with an estimated GDP 
per capita of $1,500 in 2006.27  Each case study will conclude with an assessment of 
whether its experience is best explained by the neo-liberal argument of the BWI or the 
developmental state argument of African regional specialists.  The BWI are right if ISI 
and state intervention mechanisms hampered economic growth and development in the 
three cases.  On the other hand, the developmental state school is right if the 
implementation of neo-liberal policies hampered or did not impact positively on 
economic growth and development.  This thesis concludes with the comparative analysis 
and conclusions with respect to the implications of its findings for economic policy 










                                                 
25 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Fact Book, http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-








This chapter examines the role of the public sector and the effects of its policies 
on the agricultural and industrial sectors of Nigeria between 1970 and 2005.  In 
particular, it focuses on whether the role and policies of the state and the resultant 
outcome support the arguments of the neo-liberals or developmental state advocates.  The 
period from 1960-70 is not examined because the effects of the Civil War will obscure 
the effects of economic policies significantly.  Similarly, the period from 1990 to 1999 is 
not examined because of political instability due to the annulment of elections and 
military interventions.    
The policies of the state are best understood by an examination of three distinct 
periods: 1970-85, 1986-99 and 1999-2005. The state intervened actively through legal 
and institutional mechanisms, and active participation in direct production between 1970-
85 and this resulted in a decline in industrial and agricultural performance.  A mix of IMF 
imposed neo-liberal policies and state-led development formed the basis of the period 
1986-1999. During that period, agricultural output increased tremendously while 
industrial performance was uneven.  The most significant improvements in the 
manufacturing sector were in agro-allied industries.  The period 1999-2005 heralded the 
adoption of home-grown neo-liberal policies, a reduction of the state’s active role and 
improved governance and management.  The contribution of the non-oil sector to GDP 
increased significantly, but with minimal growth in the industrial sector.  Nevertheless, 
the petroleum sector remained the dominant contributor to the GDP.  The most important 
change in this period was the pronounced reduction in the government’s role due to 
divestment in some sectors of the economy, strengthening of the bureaucracy and 
rationalization of the work force.  Overall, this chapter shows that none of the two 
arguments satisfactorily result in economic growth and development.  It is, however, 
obvious that liberalism is ultimately beneficial to growth, while state-led development 
facilitated the market in some sectors. 
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B. POLITICAL HISTORY 
The history of Nigeria is traceable to the amalgamation of the Northern and 
Southern Protectorates of 1914. This action set the stage for full British administration. 
Prior British relations were limited to trade.28  The amalgamation opened new economic 
and social orders in the country, and was based on financial and economic concerns.29  
The increased agitation for independence by the elite and a few educated Nigerians after 
World War II led to a series of constitutional negotiations culminating in the 1954 
Richard Constitution.  The Constitution led to the formation of a federal state consisting 
of three regional governments and a weak central government.  This structure led to a 
further deepening of the ethnic divisions in the polity.  British administration formally 
ended in October 1960 with the hand-over of power to the Nigerians.  The post-
independence democratic regime was ended by the military coup of January 1966 
following civil disturbances in the regional elections in the western region.30  The high 
point of instability during the period was the Civil War of 1967-70.  Military 
administrations ended in 1979 after thirteen years of military rule, only to return in 
December 1983.  This second period of military regimes ended in May 1999, and the 
country has since been under democratic rule.  
C. POLITICAL ECONOMY 
Nigeria was an agrarian economy with a significant level of extractive industry 
activity until the early 1970s. Trade between European companies and the marketing 
boards established by the colonial administration facilitated the growth of cash-crop 
export to supplement the preexisting food crop-based agrarian economy.31 The boards 
regulated purchase prices and controlled exports. Minerals such as tin and coal were 
mined beginning in the early twentieth century, but the capital intensity of these sectors 
prevented Nigerians from participating in its exploration and extraction.  Foreign 
investors earned most of the profit while the colonial government earned little.32  The 
                                                 
28 Michael Crowder, A Short History of Nigeria (NY: Frederick A Praeger, 1962), 205. 
29 Ibid, 213; and W B Hamilton, “The Evolution of British Policy Towards Nigeria” in The Nigeria Political 
Scene, ed. Robert O Tillman and Taylor Cole (NC: Duke University Press, 1962), 32.  
30 Richard Sklar, “Crisis and Transition in the Political History of Independent Nigeria,” in Dilemmas of 
Democracy in Nigeria, ed. Paul Beckett and Crawford Young (NY: University of Rochester Press, 1997), 20. 
31 Ibid., 83. 
32 Ibid., 91. 
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accumulated surpluses of the marketing boards and the earnings from the extractive 
industries financed economic development projects of the era.   
The establishment of rail links, the introduction of portable currency, taxation, 
elimination of community tolls and improved security boosted trade. The discovery and 
exploration of crude oil in 1957 did not alter economic policy in the immediate years 
after independence.  Instead, the economic base shifted from agriculture to oil-based 
commodity export in response to market forces.  At independence, the country adopted 
an Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) strategy like most developing countries. 
D. ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT POLICIES 
Nigeria was administered by two development plans prior to independence.  
While the British administration designed the first in 1945, the second was based on 
recommendations from the World Banks in 1955. The first plan was premised on 
promoting economic development by investing in social advancement,33 while the second 
focused on stimulating the economy through industrialization in line with the ISI 
strategy.34  Both plans relied upon foreign capital investment to drive the economy.  In 
the 1955 development plan, the World Bank recommended that agriculture, industrial 
production and development corporations play more positive and useful roles in 
economic development.  Consequently, emphasis shifted from provision of social 
services to industrial stimulation through public investment in infrastructure.  This 
resulted in the establishment of development corporations by the central and regional 
governments. Statutory corporations providing loans and equity finance to Nigerians and 
investing in foreign sponsored projects were also established in compliance with the 
recommendations.  A lack of coordinated planning among the regional governments (and 
regional rivalry) resulted in the duplication of projects and waste in the system, though 
foreign capital investment increased.  The first plan was deemed to have failed due to a 
lack of definitive objectives and local ownership, while the second plan was seen to have 
failed because of inter-regional competition over the allocation of resources.35   
                                                 
33 R. O. Ekundare, “Nigeria’s Second National Development Plan as a Weapon of Social Change,” African 
Affairs 70, no. 279 (April 1971): 146-158. 
34 Ibid., 148. 
35 Ibid.,147. 
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The First National Development Plan was formulated in 1962. The plan focused 
on strengthening the government’s role in shaping economic development while 
encouraging Nigerian participation in the private sector.36  However, political turmoil 
surrounding the 1963 elections and the 1967-70 Civil War hampered implementation of 
the plan.  In spite of this, the economy showed significant diversification and 
development.  Between 1962-3 and 1966-7, the industrial sector grew from 5.3% of the 
overall economy to 7%, and mining grew from 1.9% to 3.4%,37 while agricultural 
production declined from 62.9% in 1960 to 48.8% in 1970.38  Furthermore, the private 
sector drove these developments with the government’s contributions limited to the 
provision of infrastructure.  However, the enactment of Banking and Petroleum Decrees 
in 1969 and increased revenue from oil increased the government’s role in the economy 
through its equity holding in foreign capital investments in the sectors.  
After the Civil War, the state formulated three five-year development plans: the 
Second National Development Plan of 1970-1974, the Third National Development Plan 
of 1975-1980 and the Fourth National Development Plan of 1980-1984.  These plans 
formed the basis of centralized development planning until 1986 when a neo-liberal 
structural adjustment program (SAP) was adopted as the economic development 
framework.  SAP was implemented until 1993 when the government formally withdrew 
from the program.  In spite of its withdrawal, it continued to implement some of the 
policies of the program until 2003 when the National Economic Empowerment Strategy 
(NEEDS) was adopted as the policy framework. 
E. THE 1970–1985 ERA 
The Second National Development Plan was designed as a tool for social change 
and broadening of the productive base to improve the lot of the citizenry.39  The 
government’s intention to acquire and control the majority of the productive assets of the 
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country was explicit in the plan.40  This revealed the state’s perception that it should be a 
primary driver of the economy.  This was not just a purely economic policy, but rather a 
response to causes of the Civil War, e.g., social disparities among regions and the need 
for greater national integration. This policy reversal resulted from the perceived adverse 
effects of a lack of centralized planning in the preceding era, the increased availability of 
state capital as a result of oil revenue, the emergence of technocrats committed to 
national planning, and an emerging local bourgeoisie interested in control of the 
economy.41 The growth of the oil sector’s share of GDP from 0.2% in 1960 to 31% in 
1974 gave the government unprecedented leeway to acquire a major stake in the national 
economy and embark upon numerous projects across the country.  This was due to 
revenues accorded the state by virtue of the Petroleum Decree 1969 and the Nigerian 
National Oil Corporation Decree 1971, which institutionalized the state’s part ownership 
of foreign enterprises in the oil sector.  Highlights of the plan include the allocation of 
about 8.4% of public sector expenditure to industry against 2.9% in the 1955-61 Plan.42  
The significant increase in public investment in industry was consistent with the ISI 
strategy.  This policy shift was backed by additional laws meant to enhance Nigerian 
participation in a redistributive and sectorally balanced economy.  These new laws sought 
to enhance the state and the citizen’s participation in the economy as a means of reducing 
foreign domination.   
1. Private Sector Promotion 
While the policies of the preceding era resulted in increased foreign capital 
investments, the Nigerian Enterprise Promotion (NEP) Decree of 1972 and 1977 
increased Nigerian capital investments.  The objective of the policy was to increase 
Nigerian participation in the economy by establishing a ceiling on foreign capital equity 
in enterprises and broadening of the productive base.  In other words, the legal 
framework facilitated the Nigerians’ entry into commercial and less capital and technical 
intensive manufacturing sectors such as stationery and consumer goods, while 
encouraging foreign investments in high capital and technical intensive manufacturing.  
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The decree eliminated, restricted and reserved some sectors for foreign participation and 
increased government stake in foreign-owned interests by as much as 49%.43  However, 
this investment program was undermined by rent-seeking and clientelism, ultimately 
contributing to the downturn in the economy.  Rather than enhance equity participation of 
the Nigerians bourgeoisie, it benefited a few in the bureaucracy, political class and the 
business community.  This was because the local bourgeoisies were not united in the 
goals of Nigerian participation in the economy. Moreover, the state was perceived as a 
means of seeking economic wealth and furthering ethnic interests rather than national 
interests.44  While some wanted a share of the proceeds of the most successful foreign 
dominated sectors of the economy others wanted niche protection of the economy from 
foreign competition. The policy accommodated the differing views and resulted in the 
creation of avenues of exploitation by those interested only in proceeds in collusion with 
the bureaucracy.   Those interested in proceeds utilized political connections to secure 
loans from statutory institutions to procure shares.  On the whole, the broadening of the 
productive base was not achieved because the shift to production of intermediate and 
high-end goods and services did not occur because the government did not want to 
undermine investments of the multi-national companies (MNC), while they also 
exploited loopholes in the policy to maintain their hold.  The policy, however, succeeded 
in increasing Nigerian participation in the commercial sector.      
Failure resulted from acts of omission and commission by the bureaucracy and 
subversion by foreign firms.45  The failure to implement and of outcome indicated the 
government’s tacit recognition of the importance of foreign investments in the economy 
and a deliberate measure to accommodate pressure from sections of the business class.  
On one hand, inherent flaws in the indigenization policy were exploited for personal gain 
by the political elite and business community in collusion with the bureaucracy and 
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foreign-owned enterprises.  While the public sale of shares was regulated, private 
transactions were not.  This created avenues of exploitation by the politically connected 
elite (interested in a share of the successful MNC) who had privileged information and 
access to capital from government financial institutions. Federal and state commissioners 
were granted exceptional power without checks and balances to amend schedules and 
grant exemptions.46 In addition, the time allowed for compliance afforded companies 
ample time to manipulate provisions of the policy.  Some companies placed Nigerians in 
a position of ownership or responsibility as cosmetic fronts to provide legitimacy, while 
others divided their operations along the government’s categorization of investment 
profile. Furthermore, the rents created by state intervention drew local and even some 
foreign private investments away from long-term productive ventures to short-term 
investments with quick profits. On the other hand, the policy failed to reduce foreign 
control and restructure the productive base of foreign investments from production of 
low-end goods to intermediate and high-end goods and services.  On the whole, the 
measures had a slight positive effect on Nigerian involvement in the commercial and 
service sectors, while foreign enterprises focused on manufacturing.  
The government also used its increased revenue from oil exports to embark on 
various projects across the state.  The government did not extend its involvement to the 
management and guaranteed foreign investment as a mark of recognition of the 
importance of good management and foreign capital.  However, its stakes in the 
enterprises, which afforded it representation on the boards, were exploited for personal 
gain rather than national interests.  These connections also afforded the companies 
avenues to influence government policies in their own interest while serving as a means 
of procuring foreign exchange.  State officials were solicited by companies for foreign 
exchange allocations, exemptions from schedules and award of contracts in exchange for 
monetary and/or financial rewards. Thus, while the decree served to increase Nigerian 
participation, it created avenues of cronyism and corruption facilitated by the patrimonial 
foundation on which the civil service, political class and the military were founded, rather 
                                                 
46Fiona Beveridge, “Taking Control of Foreign Investment: A Case Study of Indigenization in Nigeria,” The 
International and Comparative law Quarterly 40, no. 2 (April 1991): 311. 
16 
than promoting a local capitalist class.47 Control of the commercial sector and part 
ownership of foreign firms went largely to civil servants, politically connected 
businessmen and members of the political class, resulting in a pattern of cooptation and 
clientelism rather than growth and development. Given the net effects of these measures, 
the objectives were undermined not by substance of the policies but by their 
implementation, which was in turn affected by the patrimonial nature of the state and the 
inability of the technocrats and bourgeoisie to overcome it.   
Thus, some objectives of the policy were met in that the Nigerians became part-
owners in the economy.  However, ownership had been transferred from foreign 
entrepreneurs to local political elite and their clients, leaving the local bourgeoisie on the 
sidelines.  Because access to the benefits of indigenization was dependent upon political 
connections rather than economic performance (and the new owners were political 
entrepreneurs rather than economic ones), newly locally-owned businesses failed to take 
root and thrive, management remained largely in the hands of foreign Multi-National 
Corporations (MNC), the structure of production remained largely the same, and the 
economic growth stagnated. Given these inadequacies, the arguments of the neo-liberals 
(based on human nature to maximize gains at every opportunity) that state intervention 
will facilitate corruption, cronyism, rent-seeking and neglect of the private sector is 
supported in this case.48   
2. Financial Regulations and Control 
Before 1971, foreign companies were allowed full repatriation of profits and 
dividends as incentives for foreign capital investment. The Exchange Control Order of 
1971 restricted repatriation of profit to 50% as a means of conserving foreign exchange 
and promoting reinvestment in the economy.49  The foreign exchange that was not 
repatriated by MNCs was to be offered as an incentive to local investors to initiate import 
substitution enterprises, in recognition of the fact that import substituting industries 
require significant amounts of imported inputs.  Foreign exchange payments for goods 
and machinery under Schedules I and II of the NEP Decree of 1972 were effected after 
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90-180 days of importation following the Central Bank’s approval.50  In addition, credit 
facilities were made available for imported inputs such as machinery and plants under 
Schedules I and II.   
However, here again the patron-client networks linking the business community, 
political class and the bureaucracy meant that the incentives became politicized — going 
to clients rather than those with the best investment plans — while foreign investors were 
able to use the same networks to get around the repatriation restrictions, both legally and 
illegally.  For instance, foreign-owned enterprises requiring 40-60% foreign ownership 
were split into subsidiaries under Schedules I and II such that the parent company 
retained 60% equity in each and/or used “fronts,” thus facilitating the repatriation of more 
funds under the guise of importing machinery or inputs.51  Furthermore, some foreign-
owned enterprises negotiated technical agreements with Nigerian partners that mandated 
the provision of technology choice, maintenance and innovation, all of which enhanced 
the need to procure foreign exchange or machinery and other inputs.52  At the extreme, 
the companies resorted to bribery of state officials.53  Thus, the existing patron-client 
system reinforced the abuse of foreign exchange allocation, fully undermining the 
policy’s objectives.    
Given the close linkage between the business class and state officials, and the 
attendant exploitation of the policy for personal rather than national interest, the 
attainment of set goals was doubtful.  Thus, while the policies might have been beneficial 
for the state and its citizens, the opportunities created for its exploitation in its 
implementation undermined its potential achievement. The neo-liberal argument that 
state involvement in the economy produces rent-seeking rather than development is again 
largely supported in this case. 
3. Trade Policy 
Under the ISI strategy, the state also used a regime of tariffs, import quotas and 
trade restrictions to promote and protect its industrialization effort.  Non-tariff barriers 
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such as import licenses and outright bans on imports that competed with ISI industries 
were also utilized. The licenses were designed to direct investment to areas of priority.54 
In addition to protecting and promoting industrialization, the government manipulated 
tariffs and non-tariff barriers to support its balance of payments.55  For instance, when the 
balance of payment became unfavorable in 1983, the number of products under the 
import restrictions was increased from 235 to 387 as a means of reducing the trade 
deficit.56   This undermined the coherence of the protection regime. While the adoption 
of the strategy envisaged a phased approach, the state never went beyond the first phase 
— the development of consumer goods industries — because the policy faltered there.57  
Furthermore, since reducing tariffs would deprive the state of revenue and expose local 
industries to foreign competition, tariffs were never reduced, and thus import substituting 
industries had no incentive to become competitive.  In addition, issuances of licenses 
were abused by entrenched patron-client networks, ultimately undermining set goals.  In 
its entirety, protection was not negative, but it was the implementation and the tariff 
structure that affected the performance of the industrial sector.   
Given that state intervention enhanced industrial growth, the arguments of the 
development state school, that state intervention is required to promote diversification, 
appear to be supported on the surface.  However, the sustainability of the growth was 
undermined by the same institutions which created it through rent-seeking and 
clientilism, buttressing the arguments of the neo-liberals. 
4. Agricultural Development 
Agricultural development during the period was poor due to neglect, poor policy 
choices and bias toward industrial development.  The Second National Development Plan 
(1970-74) earmarked over 80% of total investment to urban areas, with only 4.8% for 
capital expenditure on agriculture despite the fact that 70% of the population resided in 
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rural areas and were engaged in agriculture.58  The agricultural sector allocation was for 
the establishment of a national agricultural bank, extension and irrigation schemes, and 
conservation services.  However, rural smallholders, who constituted the vast majority of 
farmers, did not benefit from credit facilities because often times they were hijacked or 
exploited preferentially by urban/elite farmers.  For instance, the Nigeria Agricultural and 
Cooperative Bank allocated N341 million to 400 retired military personnel, civil servants, 
businessmen and their companies, compared to N18 million to 8,456 small farmers 
between 1973 and 1986.59  At the extreme, rural farmers were displaced from their lands 
to barren lands to make way for irrigation projects, and were at times encouraged to sell 
their lands to state officials and wealthy farmers.60  Urban/industrial bias generated 
income disparities as wage increases in the industrial sector outstripped income growth in 
the farming sector, which led to increased rural-urban migration and depletion in the rural 
labor force.61  While sectoral per capita earnings as a percentage of overall per capita 
earnings in manufacturing and construction were 26% and 23% respectively, it was only 
9% in agriculture.62   
By 1974, the agricultural sector’s share of GDP had declined to 26.5% from 48.8 
% in 1970, while agricultural export declined from 30% in 1970 to 7.2% in 1975.63   This 
led to an increased focus on agriculture in the Third National Development Plan in 1974.  
In addition to increasing its direct involvement in agricultural production, government 
improved the rural infrastructure and subsidized agricultural inputs to curb rural-urban 
migration and increase agricultural production.  In a bid to promote local processing 
industries and avoid domestic shortages, government (through the marketing boards) 
imposed a series of taxes on agricultural exports, and in some instances an outright ban 
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on agricultural export.64 However, this measure resulted in the exploitation of rents and 
smuggling of agricultural commodities into neighboring countries where producer prices 
were higher by both farmers and wholesale merchants, generating an informal economy 
which undermined economic development strategies and deprived the state of tax 
revenues.  The over-taxation (through low producer prices) also led farmers to shift 
production from exportable produce to food crops that could be consumed or sold in the 
local market, and to move into non-agricultural activities.  This scheme failed not 
necessarily by the nature of the policy but due to implementation.  The policy framework 
sought to redress the decline in performance and link with the industrial sector indicative 
of good plans.  Its failure was due to its being hijacked by the urban elite.65  The elite 
exploited the credit facilities and subsidization to the detriment of small rural farmers 
who constituted the majority by eliminating the off-set the subsidy would have provided 
on the taxes. 
In addition, the state promoted mechanized and irrigation farming to boost 
production.  However, the exorbitant cost of the establishment of the farms made the cost 
of agricultural production unaffordable by the rural farmers.  For instance, the cost per 
hectare of irrigation ranged between N1,750 and N8,000; well above the income of rural 
farmers.66  Agriculture increased from 20.6% of GDP in 1980 to 28.6% in 1983.67  
However, the increased share was due to a slight increase in agricultural export from 
2.4% in 1980 to 3.6% in 1983,68 and a decline in the international price of crude oil in the 
early 1980s.  By 1985, the share of agriculture to the GDP had declined to 24%, while its 
share of exports declined even more drastically to 2% from a high of 70% in 1960.69   
This was primarily due to the recovery in the price of crude oil in the global market, and 
secondarily to the ban on the exporting of certain primary agricultural products as part of 
the effort to promote agro-industries. 
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In this area, the policy framework’s goals were undermined by its substance as 
well as its implementation.  Fixing prices below market value undermined farmers’ 
incentives to sell to the marketing boards, leading them to smuggle their produce across 
the borders to neighboring countries where producer prices were higher. The network of 
patronage (middlemen), politicization, and the accumulated surpluses provided created 
opportunities (rents) for exploitation of the marketing boards which benefited personal 
rather than national interest.   Furthermore, mechanization did not benefit the rural 
farmers who constituted the majority, while the urban farmers could barely afford the 
cost of production.  On the other hand, the policies and their implementation hampered 
production and support the arguments of the neo-liberals that these mechanisms squeeze 
farmers, result in rural-urban migration and an overall decline in agricultural production.  
For instance, between 1970 and 1978 real food output per capita declined by 1.5% per 
annum while food imports rose from N57.7 million in 1970 to N790.3 million in 1977.70   
Given the exploitation of state mechanisms by the elite, the preference for urban 
development and the dramatic market-driven growth in the oil sector, it was no surprise 
that agricultural production declined.  The emergence of elite farmers failed to boost 
agriculture, while the urban-rural wage differential drained manpower from the rural 
areas, depriving it of a work force.  The arguments of the neo-liberals that state led 
development and ISI constitute a drain on agricultural development are supported in this 
analysis.   Furthermore, the relative increase in production due to the intervention in 
infrastructural development under the Third and Fourth NDP is an indication of the 
efficacy of state indirect support to agriculture in which neo-liberals proffer. 
5. Effects of State-led Development on the Economy 
In the short term, the industrial sector benefited the most from the government’s 
involvement in the economy having attained an 11% share of the GDP by 1981.71 
Success was driven by increased foreign direct investment under ISI and the 
government’s investment in industry and urban infrastructure. Government intervention 
also allowed politically and socially important considerations of regional balance to be 
factored into development and wealth creation.  Furthermore, by controlling the 
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economy, the government succeeded in empowering the politically-connected Nigerian 
private sector through equity holdings in foreign-owned firms while it established capital-
intensive industries that were beyond the reach of Nigerian.  
On the other hand, the fact that plans sought to facilitate social change, politics 
and geographical spread rather than maximizing the efficiency in production played 
prominent roles in the location and siting of most of the industries.  For instance, while 
crude oil is extracted in the Niger Delta region, a refinery was constructed in the north of 
the country about 1000 km away from the source of raw material and serviced by a 
network of pipelines covering about 3001 km, as a means to assuage the demands from 
the northern section of the country.72  This increased the cost of production and 
inefficiency was beyond reason.  Thus, instead of generating revenue for the state and 
establishing themselves as competitive import substituting enterprises, such industries 
became a burden on the government because of subventions and subsidies and on 
consumers because their tariff protected above-market sales prices.  More important was 
the rent-seeking and clientelist network formation that followed from government 
control, exercised both by politicians and civil servants, over not only location decisions, 
but licenses, tariffs and other factors that determined the survivability and profitability of 
infant industries.  The array of protective measures rather than encouraging competition 
and increasing productivity, and thus leading into the second phase of the ISI, resulted in 
contentment by local enterprises to concentrate on light consumer goods production 
behind high tariff barriers.  By and large, the manufacturing sector remained 
uncompetitive, unable to enter the export markets and only able to maintain local market 
share. 
The most obvious outcome of the ISI policy was a rapid increase in government 
expenditure in general, and in the industrial sector in particular.  This expansion was 
occasioned by the fact that the government, apart from establishing these industries and 
others, was funding and subsidizing services and products even in the face of obvious 
losses.  The losses were occasioned by the high cost of production resulting from a lack 
of competitiveness, rent-seeking by the management and political office holders, and the 
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poor attribute accorded such ventures as money-milking projects.  What should have 
been temporary losses on the road to developing competitive manufacturing sectors 
became perennial losses in support of patron-client networks. The long term implication 
of these unwholesome practices and policy choices was a decline in the industrial sector 
share of the GDP from 11% in 1980 to 5.7% in 1985.73    
F. THE 1986-1993 ERA 
The adoption of IMF imposed SAP in 1986 reversed the policies of development 
statism to a neo-liberal policy framework. The adoption followed a series of unsuccessful 
locally designed stabilization measures to reverse the downturn. Among other things, the 
objectives of the program were to achieve fiscal and trade balance, and promote non-
inflationary economic growth using market forces.  The goal of restructuring and 
diversifying the productive base was retained, but was now to be achieved through 
market forces.  The key policies of the program included the tightening of fiscal policies, 
adoption of a market-determined exchange rate, elimination of price control and 
marketing boards, rationalization and elimination of public expenditure and 
commercialization or privatization of most federal public enterprises.74  Each of these 
policies involved a reduction of the state’s role and control in the economy. 
1. Financial and Monetary Regulations  
The fixed exchange regime had facilitated corruption and manipulation by the 
state administration, business class and political elite, resulting in uncompetitive 
industries and stifling local investment.  The Naira had become extremely overvalued, 
making devaluation a necessary incentive to boost local sourcing of raw materials, 
marketing of tradable goods, export growth and elimination of the black market.75  
Rather than a gradual devaluation, market-forces were allowed to determine the Naira’s 
value.  Consequently, the currency’s value fell from parity with the U.S. dollar in 1986 to 
N7.40 to $1 in 1989, leading to government’s introduction of some measures to curtail its 
impact on the economy.76 The devaluation of the currency was not accompanied with 
interest rate devaluation in line with the recommendations.  The reluctance to reduce 
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interest rates reflected a policy of encouraging savings and discouraging consumption 
while boosting production.  In addition, a ceiling was imposed on credit to the private 
sector by the Central Bank.77  The net effect of these measures was the inability of banks 
to provide loans to investors, who were in turn unable to take advantage of the improved 
investment environment.  In addition, exports of agricultural produce became profitable, 
and farmers reaped the benefits thereof.  
The result in the industrial and agricultural sectors turned out as expected by the 
BWI.  Performance in uncompetitive industries declined while it increased in 
agriculture/agro-industries and industries utilizing local inputs/substitutes.  For instance, 
while the cost of imported raw materials rose by 229% between 1986 and 1987, the cost 
of locally sourced materials rose by 96%.78  Furthermore, the government’s mechanisms 
to curtail inflation and boost production through savings likewise added to the increased 
cost of production due to the ceiling on credit to the private sector and the resorting to 
illegal means to secure foreign exchange.  Similarly, the drive to promote exporting led to 
increased competition between export and local consumption/production; ultimately 
increasing the price of local raw materials.  This was most prevalent in agro-allied 
industries that sourced inputs locally.   Though the result reflected the anticipated 
outcome, the decline in performance of uncompetitive industries was perceived as 
unacceptable by local manufacturers and a majority of the citizens.  In addition, it was 
contrary to the objective the state sought to achieve through SAP.  This formed the basis 
of the criticism by the development state, local manufacturers and the reason for 
reintroduction of tariffs to protect some industries. 
2. Trade Liberalization 
The import and export licensing schemes, which hitherto served as instruments of 
regulation of exportable and importable goods, and foreign exchange allocation were 
abolished.  The new tariff regime was designed to protect some categories of local 
industries, redress the imbalances of ISI, boost industrial production through local 
sourcing of industrial inputs, and generate additional revenue.79  Thus, trade policy was 
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liberalized, but reflected a compromise between ISI and neo-liberal market-led growth 
rather than complete liberalization. These measures sought to protect potentially 
competitive sectors, while reducing corruption by moving from non-tariff barriers, such 
as quotas and licenses, to tariffs, which create fewer rent-seeking opportunities. Tariffs 
were also reduced, ranging from 5% to 30% on intermediate and final capital goods, and 
from 20% to 30% on final durable consumer goods, and 100% to 120% on final non-
durable basic consumer goods.80  Thus, the basic ISI framework was maintained with 
greater emphasis on maximizing efficiency of ISI while containing rent-seeking.  
However, the lower tariff levels left most local enterprises unable to compete against 
imports.  Even with 100% tariffs, imported non-durable consumer goods were less 
expensive than locally produced alternatives.   
Local enterprises that had been depending upon domestic price regulation of 
inputs (e.g., agro-industries) were simultaneously hit by liberalization of domestic prices.  
The Price Control Decree of 1971 and the Commodity Board Decree of 1977 were 
repealed allowing agricultural commodity prices to be set by the market.  The rationale 
behind the actions was the need to improve production and profitability of the non-oil 
sector (agriculture), and reduce corruption and government taxation, which had stifled 
production and encouraged smuggling.81  These goals were met for the agricultural 
sector, but in so doing they further undermined the competitive position of the 
manufacturing sectors that used local inputs.    
The outcome of the new tariff regime revealed the intended consequences of the 
policy: the decline in performance and subsequent closure of uncompetitive industries, 
and growth in agricultural and agro-industries.  The closure of some industries formed the 
basis of the criticism by the developmental state advocates that SAP led to 
deindustrialization.  For instance, capacity utilization in the automobile industry fell from 
26% in 1985 to 19% in 1989 and from 37% in 1985 to 24% in 1989 for the steel 
industry.82 Though this was one of the objectives of SAP (eliminating industries the state 
lacked the comparative advantage), it is evident the state was not disposed to the idea 
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from its review.  Given that the regime sought to provide some protection and enhance 
local sourcing of raw materials in principle, the trade policy could be termed not 
liberalized.  However, in practice, the reverse was the case as it was liberalized, even 
with efforts to protect local industries.  Though the result supports the arguments of neo-
liberals, it was evident that the state was disposed to its industrialization effort and would 
like the industries to continue operation. 
3. Public Sector Reform 
Commercialization and privatization programs formed the bedrock of the public 
sector reform. Privatization entailed government divestment from SOEs, while 
commercialization involved the operation of SOEs as profit-making ventures with state 
budgetary support, but operating entirely apart from the state administration. Government 
divestment and staff cuts were intended to reduce the huge financial burden of 
unproductive companies and bloated administration as a means of balancing the 
government’s budget and curtailing corruption.  The government earmarked some state-
owned enterprises for either full or partial privatization or commercialization.  The state-
owned petroleum, communication, banking, steel, and transportation enterprises were 
among the enterprises listed in the program.  However, the government retained 
ownership of strategic industries divesting from less important ones.  For instance, it 
retained its hold in some oil, communications and transport sectors while it sold 
agricultural and banking enterprises.  In addition, of the more than 120 SOEs earmarked 
for sale, only sixteen enterprises were actually sold in 1989.  These consisted of two oil 
marketing companies, thirteen insurance companies and one flour mill.  In 1990, five 
other companies were privatized.  This was largely the result of a lack of interest from the 
private sector: SOEs that had never been profitable were not seen as good investment 
opportunities.  Little progress was made at commercializing public enterprises as well, as 
the government continued to provide subventions to the major SOE and received no 
dividends from any of the seven largest.  Although allocations to SOEs fell from 33% of 
the government’s budget in 1986 to 7% in 1990, total lending from the state rose from 
N0.4billion to N1.4billion within the corresponding period.83   This indicated the failure 
of commercialization and the continued burden of SOEs on the state. 
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State institutions were also reorganized and strengthened to improve regulation of 
the financial sector.  In particular, the Securities and Exchange Commission Decree of 
1988 repealed the 1979 Decree and empowered the commission to regulate and supervise 
the capital market.  This was expanded with the Companies and Allied Matters Decree of 
1990, which strengthened the Securities and Exchange Commission’s regulatory role on 
mergers and acquisitions. The Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation and Securities and 
Exchange Commission Decree of 1988 enhanced the financial and non-financial sector 
by protecting depositors and instilling confidence in the capital market through 
registration and revoking of stockbrokers, mergers and acquisitions.  However, the 
incidences of failures and illegalities in the banking sector in the early 1990s suggest the 
bodies failed in their roles.   
Given the failure to totally divest from the industrial sector and government’s 
provision of subvention to SOEs, much was left to be desired on the attainment of set 
goals.  Also, the retention of equity in some categories of SOEs by the state is an 
indication of differing opinions between the government and the IMF on the importance 
of industrialization in the economy.   The implication of this was reflected in the 
recurrent expenditure, which rose from 10.5% of the GDP in 1986 to 15.9% in 1990.84  
In a nutshell, the continuous involvement of the state in the SOEs and retention of a large 
work force constituted a drain on revenue and justifies the call of neo-liberals for reduced 
state involvement in the economy.  In general, the lack of commitment to the program 
limited the anticipated impact of neo-liberal public sector reform policies.  
4. Promoting Private Capital   
The Indigenization Decree of 1977 was repealed by the Nigerian Enterprise 
Promotion Decree of 1987.  This action was one of numerous measures to attract foreign 
investment.  Others included the abolition of the compulsory import surcharge of 30%, 
refund of excise duties, and retention of 50% of foreign exchange earnings by 
manufacturers and tax-free dividends for three years.85  In addition, the Decree reduced 
the number of restricted areas of investments under the Indigenization Decree of 1977 
and increased the maximum equity holding of foreign capital in banks, insurance, oil 
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production and mining enterprises to 40%.86  To boost private investment in agriculture, 
the Directorate for Foods, Roads and Rural Infrastructure was established to develop the 
public infrastructure in rural areas.87 Of the estimated 60,000 km of road network to be 
rehabilitated and built under Phase 1, only 30,000 km were met by 1988.88  This was due 
to the reduced funds allocated to the project.  In 1986, only N300 million of the 
authorized N433 million was released to the directorate.  Most importantly, the plan did 
not take into account the different needs of the rural areas and was not coordinated with 
other development mechanisms.  In spite of these limitations, there were significant 
improvements in agricultural production. On the whole, these measures did not attract 
much sought after foreign investment.  Likewise, the unfavorable tariff regime and 
deregulation of the interest rate made the incentive structure unattractive to new 
investments.  Private investment peaked at 10.9% of the GDP in 1986, but declined to 
3.9% in 1990.89  
5. Effects of SAP on the Economy 
The overall effect of SAP on the economy was mixed.  While there was growth in 
the agricultural sector, growth in the industrial sector was uneven.  This is attributable to 
the policies themselves and their implementation. SAP produced growth in the 
agriculture and manufacturing sectors for the first time in years, with GDP expansion 
exceeding 7% between 1988 and 1990.90  Capacity utilization rose from 38% in 1985 to 
44% in 1989 before falling to 40% in 1990.91  The most significant increase was in 
industries using local raw materials.  For example, capacity utilization in textile industries 
rose from 45% in 1985 to 60%, while that of the steel sector declined from 37% to 24% 
in the corresponding time frame.92 This is expected given the comparative advantage of 
the agro-based sector over the industrial sector, and suggests the emergence of a more 
                                                 
86 Olukoshi, “Democratization,” 98. 
87 L.M. Olayiwola and O.A. Adeleye, “Rural Infrastructure Development in Nigeria: Between 1960 and 1990- 
Problems and Challenges,” Journal of Social Sciences 11, no. 2 (2005): 94. 
88 Ibid., 95. 
89 Moser et al., Nigeria: Experience, 33. 
90 Peter Lewis, “From Prebendalism to Predation: The political Economy of Decline in Nigeria,” The Journal 
of Modern African Studies 34, no. 1 (March 1996): 86. 
91 Moser et al., Nigeria: Experience, 27; and Olukoshi, “Democratization,” 103. 
92 Ibid., 27. 
29 
sustainable manufacturing sector based on local inputs.  Overall, however, industrial 
performance was declining.  Moreover, most of the industries produced solely for the 
domestic market, indicating that they remained internationally uncompetitive unlike the 
agriculture sector which earned substantial revenue from exports. 
Agricultural output rebounded tremendously following the devaluation of the 
currency, elimination of the marketing boards, and price control instruments. This was 
enhanced by improvements in the public infrastructure in rural areas and increases in 
world market prices of agricultural produce.  Cash and food crop production increased by 
an annual average of 12% and 13% respectively between 1986 and 1990, against 2% and 
4% during the pre-SAP era.93  The performance of agro-allied industries also improved 
significantly, largely because they utilized local raw materials or alternatives satisfying 
some of the objectives of the program.   
The unevenness in performance was a result of pluses and minuses of the policy 
and the government’s commitment to state-led development. For instance, the 
devaluation of currency raised the cost of production for industries that relied on 
imported raw materials and inputs, working against policies designed to support 
manufacturing industries.  Similarly, the demand for local inputs by processing 
industries, local consumers, and exporters resulted in an increase in the price of 
agricultural produce which contributed to inflation and raised the cost of production.  
Furthermore, tight credit to the private sector designed to control inflation, imposed 
serious constraints on raw materials and other input procurement.  The new tariff regime 
and deregulation of foreign exchange resulted in the flooding of the local market by 
cheap imports of finished products much to the detriment of local industries. 
Commercialized SOEs remained uncompetitive and continued to be dependent on the 
government for subventions.  The much anticipated increase in foreign direct investment 
anticipated by SAP did not materialize.           
Overall, SAP was designed to reduce government involvement in the economy 
while increasing the role of the private sector.  However, while this was achieved to a 
significant extent in the agricultural sector, the same cannot be said for the financial and 
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industrial sectors.  The relative success achieved in the agricultural sector could be 
attributed to the lack of the government’s direct involvement in production in the sector 
historically.  Removal of institutions that stifled competition and facilitated corruption, 
along with government investment in improving the infrastructure in rural areas, 
significantly increased production. On the other hand, the government’s direct 
involvement in finance and industry was more difficult to overcome.  The government’s 
refusal to remove subsidies continuously fueled its increasing expenditure. The refusal 
was due to opposition to the policy which resulted in riots, entrenched interests and 
concerns on the implication on local industries.   However, when subsidies and/or 
protection were lowered, local industries failed in the face of competition.  The 
fundamental problem that ISI policies had been designed to address remained the same.  
Without government intervention, the economy would fall back on exporting raw 
materials and importing manufactured goods, limiting the prospects for growth and 
development over the long run.  Given this reality, the period was a reflection of selective 
implementation of some neo-liberal policies in the early years and a reversal to some 
development state policies as time went by, and it became clear that much of the 
industrial economy would not survive the liberal policy.    
G. THE 1999-2005 ERA 
The formulation and adoption of the National Economic Empowerment and 
Development Strategy (NEEDS) in 2003 finally reduced the state’s involvement in direct 
production and strengthened is regulatory and supervisory role in the economy.  The 
adoption followed the return of democratic rule in 1999 and a regime committed to 
reduction in the government’s expenditures.  The strategy reflected a new mix of home-
grown neo-liberal and state-led policies.  The Plan was premised on a private sector 
driven economy focused among other things on macroeconomic, structural, public sector 
and governance reforms.94 The objectives of the macroeconomic reforms were to 
stabilize the economy, improve budgeting and planning, and diversify the economy to 
accommodate growth of the non-oil sector.  Many of the objectives of the Strategy 
continued those of SAP, with increased emphasis on good governance and management 
of the economy.  The inclusion of governance and management was based on observed 
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weaknesses in the administration and regulatory bodies during SAP, continuing 
weaknesses in the financial and banking sectors, and lessons learned from elsewhere.  
1. Financial and Monetary Regulations 
The latest reform of the financial sector was designed to address continuing poor 
regulatory performance of the Central Bank and commercial banks’ inability to provide 
loans to private investments and short-term arbitrage. The weaknesses in the banks were 
attributed to poor implementation of prior liberalization reforms and lapses in the 
adjustment program of the mid-1980s.  For instance, banks exploited the opportunities 
presented by the liberalization of the foreign exchange market and increased demand 
through foreign currency round-tripping.  The devalued exchange rate was below the 
market value creating avenues for quick profit.  Therefore, a new exchange regime was 
instituted to eliminate the black market trade of commercial banks through market forces 
and state intervention when needed.  New monetary regulations sought to diversify 
government revenue sources and reduce inflation while adhering to monetary targets.95 
In addition to the financial regulations, the banking and insurance sectors were 
reformed through consolidation.  The rationale behind the reform was the need to 
improve the availability of credit to the private sector and strengthen the banking sector.  
This entailed the consolidation of weak and fragmented banks with little capital base into 
strong banks with reasonable capital base.  Thus, the minimum capital base of banks was 
raised from $15 million in 2004 to $192 million in 2005.96  Likewise, the legally required 
minimum capital base of enterprises in the insurance sector was raised from $1.2 million 
to $15 million for life insurance and $23 million for general insurance.   This resulted in 
mergers and a reduction of commercial banks from eighty-nine to twenty-five, a 
generation of $3 billion from the domestic market and $652 foreign direct investment in 
the banks.97  The achievements in this instance are driven by state intervention in the 
sector. 
Budgetary planning and execution was strengthened by setting government 
expenditure on an oil price benchmark with excesses saved in a special crude account.   
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For instance, the bench mark was set at $25 and $30 per barrel in 2004 and 2005, 
respectively, when the price of crude oil in the international market was $38.3 and 
$54.2.98  This limited the effects of external shocks on the economy by creating a reserve 
which could be used to finance imports or other expenditures when the need arose. 
Similarly, sectoral spending reflected government development priorities, while 
institutionalized budget implementation reports reviewed strengths and weaknesses in 
execution.99   This measure resulted in a reversal of government budget deficit of 3.5% of 
GDP in 2003 to a surplus of 10% in 2004 and 11% in 2005, and an increase in foreign 
reserve from $7.5 billion in 2003 to $38 billion in 2006.100   The accumulation of public 
reserves facilitated an increase in credit to the private sector.101 The reversal from deficit 
budget to surplus, increased availability of capital to the private sector, and a rise in 
foreign reserves confirms the assertions of the neo-liberals on the efficacy of adherence 
to monetary policies.   While the run-up in the international price was a key driver in the 
accumulation of resources, the effective use of those resources for investment was only 
attainable under sound management.  A similar windfall during the first Gulf War led to a 
surge in oil revenues that went unaccounted for by the government of the day.  
2. Trade Liberalization 
Trade reforms were intended to address inconsistencies in trade policies 
introduced in response to pressure from domestic investors during the SAP era, which 
undermined predictability and left a tariff regime that did not create an effective incentive 
structure for import substitution industrialization.  Under the new policy, tariffs range 
from 2.5% to 150% on imports.102  The country adopted the Common External Tariff of 
the Economic Community of West African States to simplify the tariff regime and 
improve transparency in trade policy.  The common tariff regime is geared toward 
encouraging added value and diversification of the economy, with built-in gradual 
reductions in the tariff structure to prevent protection from becoming permanent as it had 
in previous regimes, and thus give protected enterprises the necessary incentives to 
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increase their productivity and competitiveness rapidly.  Tariffs were designed to give 
more protection to industries that were not yet competitive, such as confectioneries and 
rice and chocolate processing industries while encouraging competitiveness in those that 
were close (non-electrical, textile and clothing industries) by reducing tariffs on imported 
products.   
Tariffs on agro-industrial imports varied with the availability and level of 
production in the country.  Rates were generally high for those which are locally 
available but in the first stage of production.  Thus rates on fruits, water, and cigars are 
high while those on oil seeds, fats and oils, and animal products, in which the country has 
a comparative advantage, are low.  A similar structure is reflected in the manufacturing 
sector, where tariffs on petroleum and non-electrical products are relatively low at about 
11-13%, and high in footwear, rubber, fish and fish products at about 28-30%.103  The 
success of this new regime is dependent on how well the tariffs are reduced to expose the 
industries to competition to ensure their productivity and competitiveness; otherwise, the 
industries revert back to the pre-SAP era when they hid under tariff barriers.   
3. Civil Service Reform 
The reform of civil service in this period was two pronged.  On one hand, civil 
service was reformed to enhance its efficiency by the rationalization of its manpower 
usage and reduction of waste.  In 1999, only 8% of the work force in the Ministry of 
Finance had degrees relevant to economics, accounting and finance, while about 70% 
were low-level staff with secondary education or equivalent.104  The organizational 
structure of ministries and parastatals were reviewed and rationalized, the appropriate 
manpower recruited, while anti-corruption mechanisms were institutionalized to curb 
corruption.  For instance, a value-for-audit system was introduced in the public 
procurement process, publication of monthly allocation of revenue to the three tiers of 
government and the Extractive Transparency Initiative was adopted.   The attainment of 
the set goals is, however, dependent on the sustenance of the reforms.      
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On the other hand, institutional and governance issues were reformed to tackle 
corruption and patronage within the political class and civil service.  Two anti-corruption 
institutions were established to reduce corruption within the polity.  The institutions have 
been relatively effective during the period because the president was disposed to its 
establishment.  However, the long-term impact could depend on succeeding leaders. 
These measures, though noble, met with opposition from political office holders in the 
case of monthly publications and contractors and their partners in the civil service; their 
effectiveness depends on implementation in the long-term. Overall, these measures have 
yielded some improvements with the reduction in Transparency International’s ranking of 
corruption perception index from 1.2 in 2000 to 1.9 in 2005.105   
4. Effects of NEEDS on the Economy 
By 2006, eighty-six additional SOEs had been privatized against only twenty-one 
in 1990 under SAP.  It should be noted that not all SOE have been privatized, 
commercialized or concessioned.  Most importantly, the national oil company remains 
state-owned and directly controlled by the government.  One significant benefit of the 
program was the growth in foreign direct investment in the country, which rose from $1.3 
billion in 1999 to over $3 billion 2005.106  The FDI was a result of the purchase of SOEs 
and new investments in existing and deregulated sectors of the economy. The work force 
of the bureaucracy has been reduced by about 35,700 redundant and unskilled hands, and 
about 1000 graduates in various disciplines have been recruited in five ministries and 
nine parastatals; resulting in a reduction in government recurrent expenditure and 
expectation for increased efficiency.  The open bidding of contracts through the value-
for-money audit is estimated to have saved the government over $1.5 billion between 
2001 and 2005, while eliminating one important avenue of rent-seeking.107   
The liberalization of the banking and financial sectors positively impacted the 
economy, making credit readily available at no extra cost to investors, indicating the 
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efficacy of neo-liberal policies.  Equally revealing is the effect of state-led involvement in 
the banking sector which helped consolidate and strengthen the bank’s ability to perform 
their responsibilities.  On the whole, while market forces played significant roles, state 
intervention through sound and good plans, implementation and management was the 
primary driver.  The average annual growth rate in the agricultural sector from 2004–
2006 was 7%, while growth in the industrial sector was 8-9% indicating balanced 
growth.108  In large part, access to credit, export promotion initiatives and tax exemptions 
drove the increases in agricultural production.  The growth in the industrial sector was 
driven by the export of plastic products (petrochemicals) to the West African sub-region 
and international market. However, the contribution of the sector to GDP remains low 
(averaging 4%) within the period.109  Nevertheless, this marked a significant 
improvement in the economy compared to earlier efforts.  
Overall, some of the effects of the policies of NEEDS support the arguments of 
the neo-liberals and development school on the debate of economic growth and 
development.  Most importantly, the devaluation of the currency and the determination of 
value by market forces, privatization and liberalization of the public sector, and the 
elimination of commodity boards are very much in line with the practice.  As much as 
these policies in totality reflect these practices, inherent differences remain.  For instance, 
government retention of equity in some SOEs, continued promotion of ISI, involvement 
in infrastructure development and a semblance of regulation of the banking and financial 
sector run counter to neo-liberal policies.  Similarly, state intervention has been indirect 
and within a limited time frame. This suggests that perhaps that some level of state 
intervention is needed to guide the economy.  This is also obvious in the industrial sector 
given the commitment to ISI, state role in the tariff structure and financial regulation, and 
the relative performance in the sector.   
H. CONCLUSION 
Nigeria inherited a free market economy driven by agriculture and low-level 
industrial production from the British administration.  While agriculture thrived up until 
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the late 1960s, it was the industrial sector performance that became significant with the 
beginning of oil extraction in the 1970s.  In spite of the dramatic increase in government 
revenue accruing from the oil sector, poor policy choices and planning have adversely 
affected the economy.  ISI policies adopted between 1970 and 1985, rather than enhance 
agricultural and industrial performance, undermined it. The policies were reflective of the 
developmental state approach in which government regulation and management of 
market forces through a number of mechanisms served to promote industrialization.  
These include, among other things, utilization of marketing boards and price controls to 
purchase, fix and export agricultural production, a fixed foreign exchange regime, and 
utilization of a tariff regime to protect local infant industries.  While the measures met the 
objective of facilitating state development at the early years of independence as argued 
by regional specialists, they proved unsustainable in developmental terms in the long run 
owing to corruption, patronage and the heavy burden borne by the state. These problems 
formed the basis for neo-liberal criticisms of state managed development.   
The period of 1986-1999 saw the state’s haphazard effort to alter the nature of the 
economy through SAP.  While it sought to diversify and run a free market, the retention 
of earlier policies and the reversal of some of the BWI policies negatively impacted the 
economy.  Growth in the agricultural sector and agro-allied industries was facilitated by 
the removal of price control and marketing boards of the preceding decade, improvement 
of a rural infrastructure and devaluation of the foreign exchange regime in the early 
years.  However, the reverse was the case in the industrial sector where growth was 
uneven due to currency liberalization and state’s regulation of interest rate.  Most 
importantly, the rollback of the state was minimally achieved as the state held on to some 
policies enhancing its involvement in the economy.  Thus, the period was more or less 
made of two contrasting policies of a liberal and a state-led economy.  Findings 
ultimately reveal that neo-liberal policies enhance agricultural production and agro-
industries, while at the same time weeding out areas of the industrial sector where the 
comparative advantage is low.  On the whole, the policies were insufficient to totally 
address inherent weaknesses in the state.    
The adoption and implementation of NEEDS in 2003 was a far reaching effort at 
implementing the neo-liberal policies advanced by the BWI through SAP.  Much like 
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SAP, the policies among other things, sought to reduce the involvement of the state in 
direct production, while enhancing its regulatory and governance responsibilities. The 
improvements in the shortcomings in SAP and local ownership of the program facilitated 
its acceptance and implementation unlike the structural adjustment. Most importantly, 
stricter adherence to the policy, public sector reform in general, and privatization and 
reform of the bureaucracy in particular made the most significant contributions to 
improved results compared with the SAP period. While the non-oil sector improved 
significantly with export potentials compared to preceding periods, there is still much to 
be desired from the industrial sector.  In large part the growth in the sector continues to 
be driven by petroleum while industrial export is largely limited to neighboring countries.  
The relative performance in the industrial sector is attributable to regulations in tariffs 
and, to an extent, the banking sector.  This confirms that continuation with the ISI 
strategy is dependent on some level of state protection.  What needs to be done is to 
design a blend of market and state mechanisms that gradually expose industries to 
competition as the country attains some level of comparative advantage. This in turn 
requires effective implementation of economic policy by a strong government 
bureaucracy.   NEEDS has moved Nigeria in the right direction on both of these counts. 
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This chapter examines the role of the state, its policies and the performance of the 
agricultural and industrial sector in Botswana from independence until 2004.  In 
particular, the chapter will examine how the policies have facilitated developments, and 
what the implications of this are for the neo-liberals and development state theories. Two 
distinct economic and development policies formed the bedrock of development in 
Botswana.  Between 1966 and 1982, neo-liberalism drove the policies of the state.  The 
economy was driven by market forces while the government restricted its involvement to 
infrastructural development.  The policies resulted in tremendous growth in the mining 
industry.  Though the cattle industry recorded significant growth, growth in other areas of 
the agricultural sector was insufficient to achieve significant growth in the sector overall.  
Between 1982 and 2004, the state adopted a mix of neo-liberal and state-led development 
policies in an effort to promote industrialization.  This policy framework diversified the 
productive base of the economy, but failed to stimulate industrial growth, as the mining 
sector continued to contribute the most to GDP growth.  The policies also failed to 
restructure and reverse the decline in the agricultural sector, which continues to be 
dominated by the cattle industry.  Overall, the chapter will show that neo-liberal policies 
resulted in growth in the sectors where there was a comparative advantage, and was 
incapable to diversifying the productive base.  State-led development, on the other hand, 
enhanced areas with potential advantages, which the marker further exploited, resulting 
in growth.  
B. A BRIEF POLITICAL HISTORY 
Botswana gained independence from Britain in 1966.  It has been a protectorate 
rather than a colony, and has thus experienced more limited British rule and 
administration.110  The British intended to amalgamate the territory with South Africa 
through an Act of Union.111  This plan was shelved, however, due to World War II, 
opposition by traditional rulers in the territory and the rise of the National Party in South 
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Africa.  Preparations for independence led to the enactment of a constitution and 
establishment of legislative bodies.  Multi-party elections were conducted in 1965 and 
power was transferred in 1966.  Though the country has maintained a multi-party 
democracy since then, the Botswana Democratic Party has dominated since its initial 
victory in the 1965 elections.  However, unlike most countries in SSA, it has been 
politically stable.  
C. POLITICAL ECONOMY 
Livestock production was the mainstay of the economy prior to the discovery of 
mineral resources.  This was facilitated by traditional property rights, accumulation of 
wealth among a minority of cattle owners, levy and wage-labor relationships between 
local chiefs and the community.112 While land ownership was vested with the chiefs, the 
citizenry owned cattle and/or earned a living by grazing cattle on behalf of the chiefs on 
community lands in exchange for a wage.  The labor market was enhanced by the 
introduction of Hut and Native tax by the British administration in 1899 and 1919 
respectively, forcing the locals to earn money to pay taxes.113  The introduction of 
commercial ranching in the 1930s by the British administration facilitated the extension 
of property rights on grazing lands and water supply to individuals, thereby boosting 
cattle production.114  The development favored the chiefs, their close associates and the 
rich, enhancing its acceptance and entrenchment.  These formed the backbone of a 
market economy in the country.  
In addition to its agrarian economy, the country functioned as a labor pool for 
South Africa because of an initial British policy on labor migration and its unfavorable 
agricultural conditions.115  This was compounded by Botswana’s relatively low economic 
potential compared to South Africa, which had a much bigger and developed economy. 
This, among other things led to Botswana’s incorporation in the Southern African 
Customs Union (SACU) in 1910, a free trade union, and its use of the South African 
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Rand as currency.116  Botswana’s membership in the union guaranteed foreign exchange 
and relieved it of monetary and financial concerns, as it received a fixed share of tariffs 
collected at the South African entry points, and relied upon the internationally accepted 
South African Rand.  It was under this semblance of a free market that the country 
attained independence in 1966. 
D. ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT POLICIES 
Botswana was sustained by proceeds from cattle/beef exports and transfers from 
Britain prior to independence.117  At independence, a series of five-year development 
plans were instituted with the objective of growing the economy. Given its manpower 
and skill deficiencies, it retained an expatriate administrative staff that was responsible 
for central planning and implementation of the development plans.  This ensured the 
continuity and deepening of inherited practices and served to imbibe and prepare the 
local staff with technocratic ethos and requisite skills in economic and development 
planning.  Botswana has implemented nine development plans, beginning with the First 
National Development Plan (NDP) of 1966.  The attainments of macroeconomic stability, 
fiscal discipline and economic growth have been the objectives of all of the plans.  While 
the First NDP focused on development of the rural sector through the provision of 
infrastructure, the Second NDP (1970-1975) emphasized the development of the mining 
sector and its supporting infrastructure.118  The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Seventh NDPs 
focused on agricultural development in response to the decline in production and 
increased food importation, while the Eighth NDP focused on industrial development. 
Two distinct development approaches are observed in the evolution of the country’s 
development plans.  Between 1966 and 1982, the state adopted free market policies with 
limited government intervention.  In the second period (1982-2004), the state became 
active in the economy through direct and indirect involvement in production.119   
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E. THE 1966-1982 ERA 
Botswana initially pursued a private sector driven economy with the state 
providing the enabling environment. This was achieved by promoting private capital 
investment through incentives, development of an infrastructure and the establishment of 
statutory institutions. The statutory institutions include the Botswana Development 
Company (BDC), National Development Bank (NDB), and Botswana Development 
Enterprise Unit (BDEU).  
1. Trade Policy  
Botswana’s membership in SACU afforded it two key benefits.  Membership 
provided the country a guaranteed source of revenue from duties and tariffs collected 
from the entry and exit points in South Africa, and served to attract foreign capital 
investment.  Botswana’s tax structure placed no restrictions on profit reparations.  
However, while Botswana did receive significant revenue, it was unable to entice foreign 
capital investments because of the small size of the domestic market, limited economic 
potential and lack of adequate and requisite skills, and greater distance from shipping 
ports compared to South Africa.  This deepened its economic dependence on South 
Africa.   
The agreement with SACU was renegotiated in 1969 due to perceived bias against 
the smaller countries and a limited tax base.  This resulted in a significant increase from 
R1.4 million in 1968-9 to R30.46 million in 1974-5, and P104120 million in 1981-2.121  
The increases were also driven by the increased export of cattle and beef products from 
103,776 heads in 1968 to 188,440 heads in 1975.122  In spite of the increase in trade 
taxes, investments in the mining sector and food imports outstripped cattle and beef 
exports and resulted in a negative trade balance.  The balance of trade was negative for 
the first fourteen years of independence, with the exception of 1970-71 and 1978-80.123  
The trade deficit generally declined from 1973-4, when the mines began production, but 
diamond exports still did not completely offset the inflow of investment resources and 
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imports.  In addition to its membership of SACU, the state secured a guaranteed market 
for its beef products in the European Economic Community.  Unlike most countries in 
the region, it has sustained its access to the market and reaped the benefits thereof.  The 
access and sustenance is a measure of the competence of the civil servants and the 
Botswana Meat Company.  This is attributed to the fact that most civil servants were 
large cattle owners and it was in their best interest to sustain the access.   
While free trade enhanced the revenue of the state, it was inadequate to stimulate 
the investment drive in other sectors except mining.  Neo-liberal policies did not facilitate 
economic diversification and was inadequate to grow other sectors due to constraints 
such as proximity of a bigger economy and dearth of requisite skills.  Furthermore, the 
guaranteed market in EEC, which was negotiated favorably for many years, is an 
indication of the convergence of interest between the civil service and business class, and 
competence of the bureaucracy in economic development. 
2. Monetary and Financial Policies 
Until 1976, Botswana used the South African Rand as its national currency which 
shielded it monetarily and financially from the needs of a national currency. Though 
unintentional, this transitional period enabled the country to develop requisite skills and 
experience before assuming control over a national currency.  This seems to have largely 
offset the negative effects of its accumulated foreign reserve being retained and used in 
South Africa during the decade.124  More problematic was the dominance in the 
Botswana banking sector by South African subsidiaries of transnational banks, which 
were able to dictate interest rates in the absence of government control with significant 
consequences for the economy.  Most credit from the banks went to the mining and cattle 
sector (the externally-focused sectors) while that to other sectors was low, thus deepening 
the imbalance in the economy.    
Monetary and financial policy thus began only in 1976, with the adoption of the 
Pula as Botswana’s national currency and the establishment of a central bank.  The 
policies were aimed at curbing “excessive reparations through transfer pricing, abnormal 
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interest rates.”125  The government adopted measures to limit banks’ legal remittances 
abroad to profits and interest and domesticate capital accumulation in the Bank of 
Botswana.126   However, the continuing lack of control over tariffs under SACU, the 
linkages between the transnational banks and the mining industries, and the size of the 
economy constrained the effectiveness of the policy in the early years.  For instance, 
efforts to reduce the contagion of the inflation from the South African economy through 
devaluation of the Pula had minimal impact.127   
Given the liberal economic disposition, the government allowed exchange rates to 
be determined by the market, with private banks appointed as dealers in foreign 
exchange. This guaranteed a true value of the currency.  Given capital scarcity, neo-
liberal theory would suggest that the market would allocate capital surpluses efficiently 
and thus drive economic development.  However, it did not.  Between 1976 and 1980, 
deposits in the Bank of Botswana rose from P47 million to P128 million, while foreign 
reserves accumulated, reaching eight months worth of imports.128  Capital sat idle 
because of the size of the local market, lack of requisite skills, and proximity of a bigger 
and more viable market.  The failure of the market to move accumulated financial 
resources led to the initiation of the Financial Assistance Program (FAP) in 1982.  The 
state used the program to maximize the investment of accumulated surpluses in new areas 
of the economy, especially the industrial sector, through financial support.    
Meanwhile, the Botswanan government used grants, foreign aids and soft loans 
— instead of its own accumulated surpluses — to finance infrastructural development in 
support of the mining sector.  Thus, while its expenditures rose, those expenditures 
generated new revenues almost immediately, while at the same time stabilizing the trade 
balance by facilitating the growth of exports; an indication of the efficacy of good 
planning and management by the bureaucracy, which the African regional specialists 
argue over.   
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3. Promotion of Private Capital 
Economic development strategy during this period was premised on foreign 
private capital investment in line with colonial practice and in recognition of a dearth in 
local capital.  This was buttressed by the convergence of ideas between the expatriate 
bureaucrats and indigenous political class on the importance of market-friendly policies 
and individual property rights. Thus, rather than directly involving itself in the economy, 
the state provided capital and technical incentives and infrastructural development to 
promote industrialization and agriculture.  The government-established statutory bodies 
were established to extend these services. In contrast to global practices, these statutory 
bodies operated but did not share in the cost of the investments.129  This guaranteed the 
sustenance of the corporations over the long-term by promoting fiscal discipline but 
affected the government’s ability to restructure the economy since the private sector bore 
the cost of new investments.  This was reflected in the failure of the private sector to 
embark on new investments other than in the booming mining industry.   
The NDB promoted indigenous investment.  The institution exemplifies one of 
the means in which state monetary surpluses were distributed to Batswana130 to boost 
local investment and reduce the dependence of the economy on foreign capital.131  The 
NDB supported investments were considered too risky, costly or unattractive to private 
investors and banks, giving preference to infrastructural development.  In contrast to 
Nigeria, the NDB directed support largely to small- scale agriculture and industry on 
commercial terms.  For instance, it provided credit to the cattle-based bourgeoisie to drill 
or procure existing state-owned boreholes and acquire freehold farms for cattle 
production.   
It was, however, unable to meet its obligations because a large portion of the 
loans were earmarked for infrastructural development. Between 1979 and 1980, the NDB 
had outstanding commitments of P3.7 million and P9.4 million to beneficiaries.  By 
1980, of the expected 60-70,000 targeted beneficiaries, only 500 received credit in the 
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planter/cultivator packages, indicating a failure in goals.132  While the NDB focused on 
credit extension to the private sector, the BDC was established to facilitate industrial and 
services development, and the BHC to address the housing needs of private investors.  
Botswana avoided the pitfalls into which similar institutions in Nigeria fell, becoming 
involved in direct production, only to be hijacked by the urban elite and see their 
sustainability undermined by corruption and clientelism.  However, while the institutions 
were sustainable in Botswana, their goals were nevertheless undermined by dearth of 
capital, and the inability of the government to shape the economy because of the nature of 
assistance granted by the statutory bodies.   
The BDC was established in 1970 as a commercial enterprise.  It partnered with 
foreign investors seeking to promote local capital’s participation in agricultural and 
industrial development and embarking on independent projects when necessary. Pursuant 
to the government policy of avoiding state dependency, industries under the BDC were 
profit-oriented right from conception, and this was reflected in the investment profile.  
The profile indicates a pattern which exploits service sectors where the challenges of 
relevant skills and needs of the sector are not too challenging for the domestic market.  
Between 1970 and 1975, 11% of the projects were in industry, 10% in agriculture, 62% 
in estates, 1% in transport, 2% in finance and 14% in hotels/tours.133  The concentration 
of investments in estates was intended to attract foreign capital investment.   
Owing to the scarcity of funds, the initial funds for projects came from grants 
from Britain to maintain macroeconomic stability.  The trend was reversed with the 
attainment of financial capacity after diamond exports took off and the Public Debt 
Service Fund (PDSF) was established to support future projects.  The PDSF charged an 
interest rate of 14.6% on its loans.  The result of these measures is reflected in the 
performance of the statutory institutions.  BDC reported profits from 1972 until 1994.134  
The only occasion of loss was in the first year of its operation. Its sustainability was due 
to its commercial orientation and adherence to fiscal responsibility.  The successes in this 
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instance, again, are driven by the initial mechanisms of the state to exploit potential skills 
which the market failed to do.  Its sustainability is due to the market-friendly design.    
Other mechanisms used to boost private sector production were the ARDP, 
Arable Land Development Program (ALDP), and Tribal Grazing Land Policy (TGLP) of 
1975.  The ARDP sought to provide social services such as schools, roads, and health 
care in the rural areas in principle.   However, the program was designed for political 
goals to ensure political loyalty and support of the rural areas to the ruling party prior to 
the October 26, 1974 elections.135  It ended almost the same way it was conceived after 
the election because it served the political needs of the ruling party.  Most projects were a 
year behind schedule once the ruling party achieved victory in the election.  After the 
experience with the program, the state avoided projects that would politicize rural 
dwellers, ending avenues that would introduce patronage in the polity.  
The ALDP was established in 1978 under the Fifth National Development Plan 
(1979-1985) to boost small-scale arable farming.  The plan was the first concerted effort 
at addressing farming.  Previous plans, including the Fourth NDP (1975-1980), had 
focused on livestock production to the detriment of arable farming.  For instance, 73% of 
capital allocation to agriculture was earmarked for livestock development in the Fourth 
NDP in spite of the fact that the majority of the populace did not own cattle.136  The 
purpose of the ALDP was to “develop [an] improved technology package and 
disseminate [it] at [a] subsidized cost to farmers.”137  The goals were to increase food 
production, enhance income from food production and the curbing of rural-urban 
migration.138  The target audience was small-scale farmers with less than ten hectares of 
land, who formed the majority of the productive base.  Cognizance of the differences in 
problems confronting the farmers was noted in the intervention measures and addressed 
appropriately. For instance, measures used to assist farmers with draught power were 
different from those for farmers who did not have access to draught animals.139  
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However, the incentives to increase food production were offset by the high value of the 
Pula against the South African Rand, which made imported food cheaper than local 
production.   This intervention thus failed.  
The TGLP represented the state’s attempt to address economic and ecological 
transformation of the rural areas. The policy encouraged farmers to collectivize, reduced 
environmental degradation and commercialized grazing land.140 Land was divided and 
designated as commercial, communal or reserved and limits were imposed on the number 
of cattle permitted in the grazing fields.  The proceeds from commercialized lands were 
to be used to maintain communal lands that were free for public use.  
The bureaucracy resisted the policy, however.  Opponents focused on the impact 
of commercialization on rural dwellers.  While the bureaucrats in the Ministry of Finance 
and Development Planning were disposed to commercialization, officials of the Ministry 
of Local Government and Lands were against it because they felt it would leave the rural 
dwellers landless and without a means of livelihood.   In spite of the accommodation of 
the differing views, the policy did not achieve its intended goal.  Limitation on stock 
level on grazing areas was dropped, only few cattle owners moved to commercial lands 
while payment of rent was shelved for three years.  The failure was due to resistance 
from the cattle owners due to the cost of implementation and incorrect planning factors 
by the bureaucrats.  Given the fact that most political leaders owned commercial farms 
and the opposing views in the bureaucracy prevailed, it can be deduced that the political 
and bureaucratic class are somewhat independent of one another, in contrast to the 
Nigerian case. The emanation of initial resistance from within the bureaucracy equally 
suggests the independence and competence of the institution.   
Overall, efforts to boost agricultural production had mixed results.  Cattle 
production rose from 132,232 heads in 1966 to 140,783 heads in 1980 having peaked at 
229,000 in 1979,141 while crop production fell from 111.1 metric tons in 1974 to 8.5 tons 
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in 1979, but rose to 44.8 in 1980.142 The sharp decline in 1979 was due to drought. On 
the whole, the contribution of agriculture to the GDP declined from 39% in 1966 to 24% 
in 1976 before the drought.  The boost in cattle production resulted from the incentive 
structure provided by the policy, the lack of state involvement in production, and the 
decision not to impose taxes or extract rents from the industry.   Likewise, the slight 
increase in agricultural output was due to renewed focus on arable farming under the 
ALDP.   
It is obvious that the close link between the state and cattle interest, and thus 
political rather than economic considerations, undermined arable farming.  The political 
leaders in Botswana evolved from the traditional ruling class, whose economic interests 
the traditional and inherited capital economy favored.  This contrasts sharply to Nigeria, 
where the political class largely evolved from the administrative staff of the colonial 
state, and sought to acquire economic power to challenge the traditional political class.143  
For them, rent-seeking through the state was the primary source of wealth creation.  For 
the ruling class in Botswana, in contrast, wealth accrued from their cattle businesses, and 
thus policy reflected the economic rather than the political interests of the elite.  This in 
turn served the economic interests of the state and its citizens overall, through support to 
the cattle sector.   The success in the Botswana is primarily due to the fact that the 
institutions were addressed as commercial enterprises and limited to infrastructural 
development.  This approach guaranteed the sustainability of state institutions, avoided 
the dependence of investments on the state, and ensured the competitiveness of the 
investments.  In addition, the evolution of the business and political class fostered 
convergence of economic interest.  
4. Bureaucracy 
The gains and developments achieved by the state were driven by, and dependent 
upon, the nature and policies of the bureaucracy.  Rather than indigenizing the civil 
service rapidly following independence, the government decided to retain its expatriate 
administrative staff and gradually “localize” it as local skilled administrators became 
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available.144  The success of the bureaucrats at negotiating the SACU agreements and 
Shashe mining interests reinforced the initial decision to maintain the expatriate staff, 
demonstrating that the expatriate-dominated bureaucracy would apply its competence in 
the national interests of Botswana.  This was in marked contrast to other African 
countries, which were rapidly Africanizing their administrative staff.   
Furthermore, priority was consistently given to merit and skills rather than the 
need to balance the ethnic composition of the state.  The relative ethnic homogeneity and 
harmonious and inter-ethnic relations of the country likely contributed to the ability of 
the government to adopt such a policy.  Most importantly, this policy maintained the 
separation of the political leaders and the bureaucrats, resulting in the independence of 
the bureaucracy and its relative imperviousness to political interference.  This was due to 
the fact that the interests of the political leaders were immediately and consistently served 
by technocratic implementation of the state policies that promoted free market, which 
was dominated by their cattle interests.  The strength of the institutions lay in the 
foundations of the expatriate staff, commitment of the political leaders and a careful 
building of indigenous civil service learning requisite skills from the expatriate staff and 
relevant institutions. 
5. Effects of Liberal Policies on the Economy 
The growth rate for the period rose above 10%.145  Per capita income rose from 
$372 in 1965 to $1,032 in 1975.146  The diversity of investments by the BDC and 
allocation of 50% or more of her gross domestic product resulted in high growth.147  The 
most significant success in attracting investment was in the mining sector.   
Correspondingly, the sectoral share of mining in GDP rose from 0% in 1966 to 37% in 
1981-82.148  However, initially, owing to the law guaranteeing repatriation of profit, 
much of the profit was remitted to the parent company, while the government’s share was 
held in banks in South Africa.  The exercise of some monetary control provided a leeway 
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to shape and utilize accumulated surpluses in the economy.  The increase in contribution 
of the mining sector to GDP and the corresponding increase in trade balance from P27 
million in 1972-73 to P3 million in 1980-81 before the introduction of the Financial 
Assistance Program (FAP) are reflections of the efficacy of the policies choices 
(macroeconomic stability).  This contrasts sharply in Nigeria, where the trade balance 
continued to decrease in spite of increased oil rents due to failure to ensure 
macroeconomic stability.   
However, despite this dramatic growth, there was an evident lack of development 
in other sectors of the economy.  Credit from the banks reinforced the economic structure 
rather than broadening it, as the market drew investment to the booming mining sector. 
This was only reversed by the government’s intervention through the statutory bodies 
after 1975.  The involvement of the state boosted foreign investments while shaping the 
direction of economic development.  This brings some convergence in the arguments of 
the two schools with differences on the form statutory institutions should take. It is 
obvious that the market maximized short-term efficiency in private investment.  
However, it is unable to broaden the productive base.  Botswana’s statutory institutions 
and projects succeeded in doing this largely because the institutions operated as 
commercial ventures, while the state ensured macroeconomic stability through competent 
bureaucracy.    
F. THE 1982-2004 ERA 
While the preceding decade witnessed limited government intervention, the state 
took a more active role in steering the economy from 1982 with the FAP.  This shift 
followed increasing dominance of foreign capital in the economy and the perceived need 
to broaden Botswana’s economic base.  The ALDP and other instruments of the 
preceding era were very much consistent with this new approach.  The FAP aimed at 
diversifying the economy and upgrading the skills of the workforce.149  It was premised 
on the failure of the market to diversify the productive base in spite of the available 
capital and appropriate incentive structures as well as the continued dominance of foreign 
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capital.150  It sought to maximize the use of public funds in various sectors of the 
economy to jump-start the local private sector.  The program categorized investment 
support into small-scale, medium-scale and large-scale enterprises (SSE, MSE, and LSE, 
respectively) based on the capital base.  While small-scale supported investment with 
fixed assets of P25,000, medium-and large-scale supported investments of between 
P25,000 to P900,000 and in excess of P900,000, respectively.151   
The FAP took cognizance of the failure of most developing countries to utilize 
planning, subsidies and joint ownership to stimulate industrial development.  Thus, it 
adopted a market determined intervention mechanism, where investors made their choice, 
the state provided initial capital grants to viable projects, reimbursed a portion of wages 
and training costs for a maximum of five years.152  This incentive structure gave 
preference to small-scale industries in rural areas, owned by women and owner-operated.  
By 1993, the FAP supported investments had reached 4,000 in various areas of 
manufacturing and agriculture.153   
Unfortunately, the FAP’s impact was insignificant both in reducing imports and in 
generating exports.  Even so, most enterprises operated beyond the five years support 
provided by the policy, indicating that the policy was generating self-sustaining 
businesses.  For instance, the failure rate of the SSE, MSE and LSE after the five year 
period was less than 50%, below international standards of 50%.154  The BDC 
investments increased from supporting 12 firms in 1970 to 119 firms in 1996.155  The 
FAP was evaluated and reviewed occasionally to ensure it met the set objectives.  In 
2001, the Citizen Entrepreneurial Development Agency (CEDA) replaced the FAP.  This 
was premised on the inability of the FAP to meet set goals, sustainability and cost of 
establishing new projects, proneness of grants to abuse, fraud and administrative 
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lapses.156  Unlike the FAP, it gave loans rather than grants, in addition to entrepreneurial 
and management training, monitoring and mentoring.157  Forty-five percent of approved 
projects were in the service sector, 25% retail, 13% agriculture, 10% manufacturing and 
7% in estates.158  The failure rate was high with few successes in the transportation and 
information technology sector.159   This exemplifies another instance where the state has 
been able to shape the economy for the market to exploit, i.e., a market-facilitating state 
intervention. Furthermore, the ability to identify and address weaknesses in policy 
programs is an indication of the important role played by a competent and far-thinking 
bureaucracy. 
The decision to conduct viability studies and give preference to owner-operated 
projects ensured that projects were based on skills and competencies readily available, 
and potentially sustainable in the economy. Likewise, providing one-time grants rather 
than ongoing subsidies prevented dependence on government support.  However, the 
incentive regime failed to promote large-scale production for the local market or for 
export, which prevented the program from influencing the import and export portion of 
the economy.  Nevertheless, these business ventures improved the standard of living of 
small-scale producers, who might otherwise have been left out of the benefits of national 
development.  Similarly, it is obvious that given the design of the FAP, the market alone 
was insufficient to achieve meaningful effects in the overall economy, while state-led 
development could facilitate diversification.  However, the form of such involvement is 
critical.  Here again, the key to success was carefully designed, market facilitating 
government interventions.  
1. Effects of State Intervention on the Economy 
The monetary and financial regimes resulted in domestic accumulation of capital, 
but this was insufficient in and of itself to drive economic development in the face of 
limited skills and incentives.  The FAP sought to redress some of the imbalances, but it 
failed to achieve significant diversification.  By 2003-04, mining constituted 34.7% of 
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GDP, while manufacturing had declined from 4.7% in 1990 to 3.7% in 2003-04, and 
agriculture was down to less than 3%.160   However, financial services, trade and tourism 
recorded significant growth.  Tourism contributed 4% to the export sector, making it the 
second largest contributor after diamonds and before cattle.  This was made possible by 
the investments in infrastructure and the hotel and tourism sectors by the BDC and the 
FAP.161   
This general decline of agriculture is the result of the miniscule efforts to address 
the sector through various programs.  For instance, cereal production between 1982 and 
1986 was barely 10% of domestic needs, indicating a significant shortfall in target.162  
While arable farming declined, cattle production grew and remained profitable.  By 1994, 
output from the company was 158,000 heads, up from 132,232 heads in 1966, with a 
revenue of P222,279 against P6,805 in 1966.163 
State support to industrialization through the FAP achieved some successes in 
stimulating employment: 8,200 jobs were created between 1982 and 1993, with SSE 
creating 41.1%, MSE 49.5% and LSE 9.8%.164  However, the objective of expanding the 
industrial base was not met.  Indeed, manufacturing’s share of GDP actually dropped 
from 8% in 1976 to 5.3% in 1993-94,165 and 3.7% in 2003-04.166  However, some 
diversification was achieved in the textile and metal works industries.  Growth in the 
trade sector was facilitated by the continued membership of SACU and the monetary and 
financial regime.  Revenue from SACU grew from P73.9 million in 1971 to P852.6 
million in 1992.167 Of note was government intervention in the monetary policy. Though 
primarily determined by market forces, the government intervened occasionally to ensure 
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the Botswana economy remained competitive, primarily through the tools of currency 
devaluation and pegging the Pula to a basket of currencies.   
G. CONCLUSION 
It is apparent that the market drove economic growth in the cattle industry due to 
the capacity and nature of the bureaucracy and inherent traditional antecedents of a free 
market. This case exemplifies the efficacy of ensuring macroeconomic stability for 
sectors in which the economy has a comparative advantage.  However, the liberal policies 
failed to diversify the productive base of the economy, necessitating the state’s 
intervention, which was also insufficient to achieve significant sectoral development.   
The relative success and survival of the intervention mechanism and private investments 
promoted by it was due to the adoption of market friendly, limited and commercialized 
state support.   This differed significantly from the practice in Nigeria, where the state 
provided subsidies and held substantial equity in a large number of SOEs.  Growth was 
recorded in the service sector where the infrastructure was available and skills 
requirements were lower than in manufacturing.  On the whole, neither approach 
achieved economic development despite sustaining the world’s highest economic growth 
rate for decades.   However, Botswana’s experience does demonstrate that a balance must 
be struck between market- and state-led approaches if any meaningful development is to 
be achieved. State interventions must be commercially oriented to ensure fiscal 
responsibility, and sustainability, and must provide support only within the shortest 
possible time for the market to enhance efficiency and its competitiveness.  Still, 
Botswana, like Nigeria, ultimately failed to promote sectorally balanced economic 
development.     
56 





This chapter examines the effects of the role of the state and its policies on the 
performance of the agricultural and industrial sectors in Malaysia from independence 
until the early 2000s. In particular, the chapter will examine how the policies facilitated 
development vis-à-vis the arguments of the neo-liberals and developmental state 
advocates.  Malaysia first adopted liberal and later a mix of neo-liberal and state-led 
policies in its development strategies.  Neo-liberalism formed the bedrock of 
development policy between 1957 and 1970.  This resulted in growth in both the 
industrial and agricultural sectors.  The adoption of state-led policies between 1970 and 
1990 was premised on the accumulation of sufficient capital in the preceding years, and 
the need to both empower the indigenous Malays and diversify the economic base.   
Unlike the previous two cases, the Malaysian approach facilitated growth in both 
the industrial and agricultural sectors. The economic base broadened from its dependence 
on agriculture to include consumer and intermediate industrial goods.  Between 1999 and 
2000, the role of the government in the economy was reduced in the wake of dwindling 
foreign direct investment while the state exercised control on the foreign exchange 
regime against all odds.  The blend of neo-liberalists and state-interventionist policies 
created growth in both sectors of the economy. This suggests that economic development 
in developing countries such as in SSA is achievable only within a right mixture of the 
approaches.  Unlike elsewhere, patronage did not have negative consequences on the 
economy, contesting the assertions of neo-liberals.  
B. BRIEF POLITICAL HISTORY 
Malaysia gained independence from Britain in 1957 under a Westminster-style 
government.  British involvement began in 1874 when the Sultan of Perak, head of one of 
the federating states, accepted British indirect rule.168  This initiated similar action in 
other territories in what became known as the Federated Malay States (FMS) in 1909.169  
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The country had been under Portuguese and Dutch administration at various times before 
British rule.  The vastness of its mineral resources, low population and limited indigenous 
technology resulted in migration and settlement of Chinese, Indian and other Asians 
citizens.  By 1931, the immigrant population outnumbered the indigenous Malay 
population, leading to an embargo on further immigration.   
As in most developing countries, indigenous nationalist organizations formed 
after World War II. The United Malay National Organization (UMNO) came together in 
1946 in opposition of British plans to unite the federated states under a unitary 
government, creating an umbrella Malay political organization.  An Indian party, the 
Malayan Indian Congress (MIC), also formed in 1946 after the visit of the Indian Prime 
Minister.170  The period also witnessed the emergence of a Chinese insurrection seeking 
political power, which was defeated by the British administration in 1953.171  These 
actions and agitations elsewhere changed British perceptions of the situation, and led to a 
promise of independence in the shortest possible time.  This appealed to the Malays and 
Indians, and undermined the Chinese insurgency.  Among other things, it resulted in the 
formation of an alternate Chinese party, the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA), more 
favorable to British interests.172     
During the constitutional conference of 1948, the UMNO capitalized on the 
absence of the Chinese and Indians to secure a good bargaining position with the British 
administration.173  The powers of their traditional rulers were reinstalled, unification of 
the colonies was shelved, citizenship residence requirements were extended to fifteen 
years, and the ability to speak Malay was added as a requirement for Malay 
citizenship.174  Furthermore, the agreement strengthened the central government and 
provided for a legislative council.   In 1954, the three parties merged and formed the 
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Alliance Party.175  The agreement formed the basis for the constitution of Malaya in 1957 
and Malaysia in 1963. The Malays and Chinese/Indians negotiated the political and 
economic direction of the country, based on Chinese/Indian dominance in the economic 
realm and Malay dominance of political power.  They agreed to institutionalize 
citizenship to all who were born in the country before August 31, 1957, and to adopt 
Malay institutions, religion and symbols for the state.176  In the election of 1955, the 
Malays won most political posts with a small number going to the Chinese and Indians. 
However, Chinese and Indian political involvement has risen consistently under the 
democratic regime that has remained in place since independence. 
C. POLITICAL ECONOMY 
Tin and gold mining were the mainstay of the economy in the nineteenth century.  
Trade in minerals was facilitated by the British East Indian Company.177 Control was, 
however, exercised by the traditional chiefs through taxes.  Exploration was enhanced by 
the introduction of new technology by the Chinese and British and increased global 
demand.  While tin boomed in the nineteenth century, the demand from the automobile 
industry in the United States transformed rubber production into an export commodity in 
the early twentieth century.  Production was facilitated by the establishment of very 
profitable plantation farms by European investors.  Rubber plantations paid dividends of 
between 225% and 375%.178  In response to the shortage of local labor, the colonial 
administration encouraged the migration of Chinese and Indians to fill the needs of the 
plantations and emerging industries.  To facilitate export, the administration also 
constructed rail and road networks.  These actions resulted in the creation of a wage labor 
market, international trade and some semblance of capitalism in the colony.   
The depression of 1932 exposed the imbalance in the economy (dependence on 
the global market and reliance on export of only a few primary products). This led to 
regulation of exports as a mechanism of influencing global prices (achievable because 
Malaysia produced half of the worlds supply of rubber) and diversification of the 
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economic base to include rice production.179  Rice production was facilitated by the 
construction of infrastructural facilities, research and extension services.    
Promoting rice also assuaged resentment among the indigenous Malays by 
enhancing their financial power through rice cultivation.  In the 1950s, the economy was 
controlled 100% by foreign capital.  The Europeans controlled 60% of the tin industry 
while the Chinese controlled the remaining 40%. In addition, Europeans controlled 83% 
of rubber plantations while the Chinese controlled most of the rest (14%).180  This 
dependence on foreign capital resulted in capital flight through repatriation of profits of 
M$ 844 million between 1955 and 1961.181  This was largely driven by European 
investors.  It was with this market economy dominated by foreign capital and trade that 
the country was granted independence in 1957. 
D. ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT POLICIES 
Malaysia has grown from being an exporter of rubber and tin to an exporter of 
manufactured industrial goods. This achievement was facilitated by inherited and adopted 
policies, which resulted in increased local capital and investment in the economy.  Three 
distinct eras are identifiable in the evolution of economic policy.  The first twelve years 
(1957-69) were a period of market-driven growth with limited government intervention 
in the economy.  The next twenty years (1970-90) saw significant government 
intervention, and the period since 1997 has seen a reversal in some of the intervention 
mechanisms adopted in the preceding two decades, and a mix of liberal and 
interventionist policies. 
E. THE 1957-1969 ERA  
Pursuant to the compromise agreement between the nationalities in the 1957 
constitution, the state initially pursued a predominantly liberal policy and rural 
development plan using state instruments to shape the economy in ways in which the 
market takes precedence.  This was based on an open market driven by foreign private 
capital. The state encouraged and supported industrialization with infrastructural 
development, extension of credit facilities and protection to “infant industries.” Unlike 
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most developing countries, it did not get involved in direct production.182  Its First and 
Second Malaya Plans of 1955-65 and First Malaysia Plan (FMP) of 1966-70 focused on 
infrastructural development, allocating over half of capital expenditure to the sector with 
the goal of facilitating private investment.183   
1. Promotion of Private Capital 
The promotion of local private capital was facilitated by adherence to the 
compromise agreement that the economy be private sector-driven.  This was tacitly 
instituted in the FMP, which limited the government’s role to infrastructural development 
of rural areas and a commitment to favorable fiscal, monetary, and trade policies.  The 
Pioneer Industries Ordinance of 1958 and assurances/guarantees on nationalization and 
free repatriation of capital and profits promoted badly-needed foreign investments.184  
The ordinance accorded investors incentives on taxes, labor, export and location.  New 
labor-intensive industries were granted tax relief of 40% on profits for 2-5 years 
depending on the size of the initial investment.185  Investments in excess of $250,000 
were granted a five-year tax exemption.  Furthermore, the policies offered infant 
industries temporary protection to shield them from competition.186    
By the late 1960s, the development strategy had not achieved an increased in 
domestic participation and backward linkage among other things.  Although foreign 
capital investments grew, most companies established subsidiaries utilizing imported raw 
materials and semi-finished products rather than utilizing local inputs.187  The products 
were produced for the domestic market, following the incentives created by the tariff 
regime.  The net result of these policies was a deepening of the poor linkage between the 
agrarian and industrial sectors and dependence on export of primary agricultural produce.  
Similarly, the number of employees was far below the expected target because the 
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industries generated few jobs.  The result of the policies underscores the consequences of 
such trade structure and ISI, an argument neo-liberals assert against such policy choices.     
Given the failure of the policies and exhaustion of ISI, the government shifted 
emphasis to export-oriented industrialization (EOI).  EOI was institutionalized through 
the Investment Incentives Act of 1968.  The earlier incentives under ISI were retained in 
addition to the new strategy. The act aimed to stimulate industrialization, diversify the 
economy, and most importantly, reduce imports and increase exports.188  The incentives 
included tax holidays for eight years, an income tax, and import duties exemptions.189  
Correspondingly, a new tariff regime was instituted to protect the production of consumer 
goods for the domestic market. By 1970, foreign involvement in the economy stood at 
60.7% with ethnic Chinese, Indian and Malay controlling 22.5%, 15% and 1.9%, 
respectively.  This is to be expected given the preference for foreign capital.  By 1970, 
the contribution of agriculture to GDP had fallen from 40% in 1960 to 31%, while 
manufacturing rose from 9% to 13%.190  However, tin and agricultural exports still 
accounted for about 80% of foreign exchange earnings.191  The decline in agricultural 
share was due to an increase in the contribution of manufacturing and other sectors and a 
fall in global prices of rubber, not a decline in production.  Similarly, the continued 
dominance of tin and agricultural exports reflected the consequences of ISI (exports 
under EOI was in its infancy) in increasing manufactured production for the domestic 
market through most of the decade, consistent with the arguments of the neo-liberals on 
the effect of tariff protection on the economy.  The increases in foreign private capital 
investments were not necessary due to market forces, but by state intervention.  However, 
the results of the interventions were unable to contribute significantly to the economy.  
Also obvious is the fact that the market only exploited areas of comparative advantage, in 
this case agricultural production.  
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2. Infrastructural Development  
Malaysia also pursued infrastructural development to stimulate private sector 
investment in the economy.  This covered both urban and rural areas.  While rural 
development was geared towards boosting agricultural production and enhancing the 
economic power of Malays, urban development targeted infrastructural support to foreign 
capital investment. Thus, the state allotted a significant portion of expenditures in the first 
three development plans to infrastructural development (52%, 46% and 32%, 
respectively).192   
Rural development was geared towards reducing inequality, stimulating economic 
development and diversifying the economic base.  It entailed direct and indirect 
interventions, including the establishment of statutory institutions, provision of extension 
services and improvement of the infrastructure.  The most concerted government effort in 
rural development was through the Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA), 
which evolved from a coordinating and financing scheme to a direct player in agricultural 
production and development.193  It established farming settlements with the necessary 
infrastructure and relocated rural dwellers to the settlements.  The farms were managed 
by the authority and operated by the farmers until the cost of establishment was off-set by 
the farmers.  As a result of the program, oil palm production increased as the world price 
of rubber was declining.  Communal buy-in was enhanced through the payment of wages 
in exchange for labor.  FELDA paid M$400 per family per month, which was above the 
average wage income during the period.   
Given all of this, it is clear that the state used a dual approach to stimulate 
agricultural production.  On one hand, it owned settlements and farms which it used to 
shape and direct agricultural production.  On the other hand, it avoided it becoming a 
burden on the state by selling to the farmers.  Thus, the expectation that the farms would 
eventually be owned by the farmers shifted the source of revenue from the state to the 
farms and its produce, thereby ensuring they were sustainable for the long-term.   This 
reveals a blend of policies from the two schools, an approach which met with significant 
success.  Oil palm acreage had increased from 100,000 acres in the 1950s to 675,000 in 
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1970, while rubber declined from 2 million to 1.5 million acres.194  Likewise, rice 
production rose by 150% from the early 1950s to the early 1970s.195  While state 
involvement in production had undermined development in Nigeria, the reverse was the 
case in Malaysia.   The effects of the policies diverged between the countries because in 
Malaysia the policies ensured that state involvement was relinquished to the farmers, who 
were treated as part-owners.  Moreover, Malaysia avoided providing grants or subsidies 
to the farmers, thus reducing avenues of fraud or corruption.  In addition, the provision of 
the settlements and wage served as an incentive to buy-in. 
3. Bureaucracy 
Malaysia inherited a fairly competent bureaucracy, unlike Nigeria.  The 
bureaucracy was indigenized gradually, ending in 1970.196  The colonial administration 
implemented a difficult promotion program and slow system that ensured limited 
progression of Malaysians (in the junior service) to the senior cadre largely occupied by 
the Britons.  Thus, reasonable skills and some specialization were achieved prior to 1948, 
when the British began to gradually transfer decision-making to indigenous leaders.  This 
ensured that indigenous civil servants acquired relevant skills before assuming full 
responsibility for policy making.  More so, the federal system of government ensured that 
Malayans learned to work together across ethnic divides prior to independence. 
The bureaucracy in Malaysia has never been independent of the political class due 
to the antecedents.  It serves as an instrument of UNMO-led Malay economic 
advancement and political dominance of the country.197  For instance, the first-generation 
of political leaders were initiated into governance through the colonial bureaucracy.  The 
import of this close link manifested in the close link between the two classes following 
state intervention in the economy.  Efforts to curtail weaknesses and abuse of office 
through institutional and procedural mechanisms such as the Anti-Corruption Agency 
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(ACA) and Auditor Generals Office (AGO) were not successful.198  The failure is due to 
the close link between the civil servants and the political class, shortage of necessary 
skills and manpower in the ACA and AGO, slow bureaucratic processes and dependence 
of these institutions on the state.199      
4. Implication of Liberal Policy Regime on the Economy 
By the end of 1969, government interventions and private sector investment had 
produced significant development.  Manufacturing share of GDP rose from 9% in 1960 to 
13% in 1970, though mining stagnated at 6% while agriculture declined from 40% to 
31%.200  In the export sector, oil palm increased from 2% to 4% and tin from 17% to 
25%, while rubber declined from 63% to 44% between 1956-60 and 1966-69.201  
Earnings from export rose from US$0.842 million in 1961 to US$1.368 million in 
1970.202   
F. THE 1970 – 1986 ERA 
Beginning in 1970, the state intervened more actively in the economy through the 
Outline Prospective Plan, otherwise called the New Economic Policy (NEP).  The policy 
reflected the state’s perception of development as an instrument of social change, and it 
equally reflected in its implementation.203  The new goals were the eradication of 
poverty, reduction of inequality between rural and urban areas in general, and Malays and 
non-Malays in particular.  The policy shifted emphasis from rural agricultural production 
to urban non-agricultural development, and redistributed state resources to cater for 
Malays.  Consequently, public expenditure rose from M$4.6 billion in the First Malaysia 
Plan (1966-70) to M$10.3 billion in the Second Malaysian Plan (1970-1975), and 
M$31.1 billion in the Third Malaysia Plan (1976-1980).204  The state established various 
enterprises, regulatory and statutory authorities, and promoted export-oriented industries 
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by encouraging foreign investments in those sectors.  The interventions were driven by 
the Industrial Coordination Act and the Capital Issues Committee established at the end 
of the decade.  
1. Public Sector 
Direct involvement in production in some industries strengthened the 
government’s role in the economy.  Interventions in the public sector were made through 
the Capital Issues Committee established in 1968, as well as newly established 
development and statutory organizations, and through the Industrial Development Act of 
1974.   Three categories of SOEs were established; department enterprises, statutory 
bodies and limited companies.   Department enterprises provided public services, while 
statutory bodies enhanced Malay participation in the economy through institutions like 
the Malaysian Industrial Development Authority (MIDA) and Muda Agricultural 
Development Authority (MUDA).  The managers of these businesses were Malay elite 
from the royalty or former civil servants.205 
The government participated in the economy primarily through a national 
corporation, Perbadanan Nasional Bhd (Pernas).  The Ministry of Finance established 
Pernas as a trust holding company for Malays.  Pernas acquired equity in publicly listed 
companies in partnership with foreign investors focusing on export manufacturing 
industries, resource-based industries, banking and some high technical industries.206  By 
1975, Pernas’ fully-owned investments were in excess of M$100 million, while its 
associate companies (partnership ventures) had about M$380 million.207  By the end of 
the decade, it had stakes in major investments with a peak profit of M$179 million.208   
The Industrial Coordination Act of 1975 represented the height of efforts to 
promote industrialization and empower Malays.  The act provided for 30% equity 
participation reserved for Malays in unexempted companies and segregated economic 
development along ethnic/race lines due to the preferential treatment.  In addition to 
using Pernas to acquire equity in companies, the government repealed or relaxed laws 
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that had prevented state economic development corporations (SEDC) from participating 
in direct production and borrowing funds from overseas.  The corporations which had 
hitherto limited their activities to providing infrastructural facilities in line with previous 
policies now embarked on direct production in manufacturing enterprises and acquired 
equity on behalf of the Malays. The dominance and hegemony of UNMO, increasing 
intervention of the state in the economy, profitability of industries and tacit advancement 
of the Malay participation led some investors to lobby politicians and bureaucrats for 
access to state rents.  In addition, others sought protection from foreign competition, 
allocation for licenses, subsidies and monopoly rights in return for offers of discounted 
stock options and directorship on boards of companies.209  This saw the introduction of 
rent-seeking and patron-client networks in the polity. 
Given the increased involvement of the political class in policy making, concern 
about Chinese domination of the economy and the need to redistribute wealth, patronage, 
corruption and cronyism soon became prominent.  The state’s more direct involvement, 
as opposed to its indirect influences in previous years, had created avenues for rent-
seeking that had previously been absent.  For instance, Pernas bought a 40% stake in the 
third largest bank, United Malaysia Banking Corporation, from the Minister of Finance 
under questionable circumstances following the recession of the 1980s.210  Likewise, the 
company sold some of its stake in a profitable enterprise under questionable 
circumstances to a protégé of the minister.211  In another regard, ethnic Chinese elites 
began to use Malay-owned fronts to protect their investments from government take-
over.  The net effect of these interventions was the introduction of patronage, rent-
seeking and cronyism in economic development.  
Unlike Nigeria, however, the SOEs were profitable and the performance of 
manufacturing increased from 13% share of GDP in 1970 to 26% in 1989.212  This result 
provides further insight into how and when patronage impacts negatively on the 
economy, considering the circumstances and origin of its establishment in both countries. 
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In Nigeria, patronage predated the state intervention of the 1970s and was facilitated by 
inherent traditional practices and the decentralized state structure.213  For instance, the 
colonial administration ruled through the traditional chiefs in Northern Nigeria, while it 
adopted relative higher level of direct rule through very few expatriate staff in a greater 
part of Southern Nigeria, resulting in very weak government institutions.  Traditional 
chiefs were used to extract taxes through a system of rewards by the colonial 
administration rather than through formal institutional mechanisms, thus, encouraging a 
patron-client relationship. In addition, the institutionalization of weak central and strong 
regional governments (along ethnic lines) prior to independence deepened the inherent 
weaknesses and created pull on the centre.   
In Malaysia, on the other hand, patronage was introduced by state intervention but 
the complimentary relationship between the political and bureaucracy class and the 
nature of the state as a whole reduced any negative effect it could have had.  Malaysia 
was a federal state with a strong central government prior to and after independence 
unlike Nigeria.  Most importantly, the first generations of political leaders in Malaysia 
evolved from the bureaucracy unlike Nigeria were it evolved as a different institution 
independent of the bureaucracy.  In addition, though the bureaucracy was relatively 
weak, it received tutelage from the colonial administration through a slow system that 
ensured requisite skills and competence are imbibed by Malays.  Furthermore, 
indigenization of the bureaucracy was gradual lasting about 13 years unlike Nigeria 
which indigenized the institution on attainment of independence.  This suggests that 
patronage does not have dire consequences on an economy if the bureaucracy is 
relatively strong and the political structure of the state does not facilitate regional or 
ethnic divides. Pursuant to the goals of OPP, additional statutory and regulatory bodies 
were established, including the Urban Development Authority (UDA) and the Credit 
Guarantee Corporation (CGC).214 These organizations also sought to empower Malays 
pursuant to the NEP.  The consequence of the interventions was an increase in public 
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expenditure from M$137 million between 1966 and 1970 to M$564.6 million between 
1971 and 1975, and M$1.16 billion between 1976 and 1980.215   
2. Promotion of the Private Sector 
The state continued with the policy of the private sector driving economic 
development and increased its involvement in shaping the economy.  However, 
preference was still given to foreign capital due to ethnic Chinese dominance of domestic 
capital.  This bias continued to reinforce the dominance of foreign capital and limit the 
contribution of local capital.  The driving policies of the period include the Capital 
Investment Committee (CIC) established in 1969, Labor Utilization Relief of 1971, and 
Industrial Coordination Act (ICA) of 1975.216  While CIC promoted local capital and 
Malay entrepreneurship, ICA was targeted at foreign capital.  The Labor Utilization 
Relief promoted labor-intensive industries and Malay empowerment in the midst of 
economic growth, in an effort to limit capital intensity of EOI industries.    
The Pioneer Industrial Act established a fair number of new enterprises.  
However, while the state targeted labor-intensive investment, the majority of the 
industries established were capital-intensive, providing limited employment 
opportunities.217   Moreover, most were situated in urban areas, while the target of the act 
was the rural populace.   This formed the basis of the adoption of the Labor Utilization 
Relief.  The relief encouraged labor-intensive rather than capital-intensive industries 
through its incentive structure.  The most significant policies during the era were the 
Industrial Coordination Act of 1975 and the establishment of export processing zones.  
The Industrial Coordination Act introduced the issuance of licenses as a mechanism of 
coordinating and organizing the manufacturing sector in the economy.218  Although the 
act was vague on conditions for issuance of licenses, indications were that location, 
market arrangement, equity structure, use of local professionals, and employment 
potential were key criteria for issuance.219  Just like its predecessor, the act sought to 
enhance Malay participation in industrial development.  However, it exempted some                                                  
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industries from adhering to earlier policy reserving 30% employment positions to 
Malays.  The export promotion incentives included the establishment of ten export 
promotion zones offering free trade, tax-free operation, export insurance schemes, 
elimination of the NEP and Industrial Coordination Act, and offer of cheap labor through 
reduced wages.220 
Given the discriminatory objectives of the IC Act, CIC and the statutory and 
regulatory authorities, most Chinese investors either patronized/established business ties 
with Malay elites or concealed their investments.221  At the extreme, some relocated 
overseas, thus reducing the contribution of local capital in the economy.  At the same 
time a new Malay entrepreneur class assisted by the state through rents, emerged in 
various sectors of the economy.  The equity participation of Malays in the manufacturing 
sector rose from 41.8% in 1975 to 54.4% in 1985, while foreign ownership declined 
correspondingly from 27% to 17.8%, respectively.222   However, just as some invested 
the rents positively, some abused or wasted such opportunities.223 The net effect of these 
policies was the tacit introduction of cronyism between the political class and business 
class.   The success of the indigenous Malays reflects some of the arguments of the 
development state on the use of rents.   This, however, contrasts with what was obtained 
in Nigeria.   One major difference is that while advancement of Malay interest was seen 
as a means to balance Chinese economic strength, a different picture was painted in 
Nigeria, where rents were seen as a means of sharing proceeds of state revenue.  
Moreover, the inherited political structure in Nigeria, rather than foster national interest 
or unity, entrenched the divisions along ethnic and regional lines. Furthermore, while 
patronage was introduced by state intervention in Malaysia, it predated state intervention 
in Nigeria.   This suggests that it is the circumstances and origin of patronage rather than 
patronage itself that determines its effect on economic development. 
Quite unlike the preceding development plans, the Third Malaysian Plan (1976-
80) saw an increased role for private sector funding and focused on poverty alleviation of 
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all Malaysians.224 It was a tacit recognition of security implications of fostering ethnic 
advancement in a multi-ethnic society.225 The increased allocation to agriculture from 
M$2.3 billion to M$4.74 billion represented an increase from 21.7% of allocations in the 
Second Malaysian Plan to 25.5% in the Third Malaysian Plan.226  Correspondingly, the 
allocation to utilities rose from M$931 million in the Second Development Plan to 
M$2.14 billion representing 9.5% and 11.9% of allocations, respectively.  Of note was 
the lack of any increase in allocation to statutory bodies such as Pernas, UDA and 
MARA.227  The expected contribution of domestic capital to fund the plan was M$26.5 
billion.228 
For the most part, the policy remained consistent in the agricultural sector, largely 
because the majority of Malays resided in rural areas and the efforts of FELDA enhanced 
them economically. The Third Malaysian Plan increased productivity through 
infrastructural development like irrigation and drainage schemes for rice and increased 
allocation to rubber replanting from 1.6% to 3.6% in total spending.229  The 
establishment of a commodity exchange in 1980 facilitated trade in oil palm and linked 
the local market more effectively to global trade to the benefit of local producers.   
The new plan sought to reduce exploitation of producers by middlemen and 
protected consumers by introducing price controls and direct involvement in rice 
production in 1974.  Unlike elsewhere, the prices were set above the global price to boost 
local production.  By the 1980s, the state liberalized the agriculture sector with the First 
National Agriculture Policy (NAP) and extended subsidies to rural farmers.  The policy 
sought to develop new lands while using subsidies to encourage rice farming by reducing 
the cost of production.  This was achieved by the government bearing the cost of milling 
to reduce costs to consumers without reducing income to farmers.  These costs were then 
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off-set by the profits made from the state’s monopoly on importation.230  In spite of these 
gestures, the system was corrupted by middlemen who stifled profit to the rural farmers 
through illegal practices.231  For instance, rice grades were mixed, price subsidies were 
manipulated to benefit traders and millers instead of farmers, and there are under-the-
counter payments between producers and marketers.232   
The effects of policies and the result of the agricultural sector support the 
arguments of the neo-liberals and development state alike.  While the avenues for 
corruption meets the arguments of neo-liberals that state involvement breeds grounds for 
exploitation of farmers and an eventual decline in performance, the governments role in 
shaping and directing agricultural production justifies the development state school.  It is 
doubtful that the success achieved in oil palm and rice production could have been made 
without government support.   However, the choice of commercializing the project right 
form inception and ensuring communal buy-in reduced its exploitation for rents.  Thus, it 
is not necessarily state intervention that ensures policy failures, but the nature of its 
design.  State intervention (in rice, oil palm and rubber production) in this instance is 
market-oriented providing direct price benefit through the global price to farmers.  
Furthermore, it avoided (oil palm and rubber) dependence on the state by relinquishing to 
private investors in the shortest possible time.  
3. Monetary and Financial Regulations 
The adoption of a fixed and predictable exchange regime by the state enhanced 
the EOI.  The currency was pegged to a basket of hard currencies such as the U.S. Dollar, 
the Japanese Yen and the Euro, which invariably tied the performance of the economy to 
the value of these currencies.233  The Plaza Agreement of 1985 between the U.S. and 
Japan, which led to the devaluation of the U.S. currency against the Yen, benefited the 
Malaysian economy because production and exports became cheap compared to Japan.  
This resulted in an increase in foreign direct investment (FDI) from M$325 million in 
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1986 to MR6.2234 billion in 1990, and a reduction in the government’s deficit budget.235 
Although the monetary regime boosted production and FDI in the short-term, it later 
became a hindrance to economic development.   The economy became dependent on the 
relative values of the hard currencies in the international market.   For instance, an 
agreement between the U.S. and Japan on review of their exchange rate in the mid 1990s 
resulted in an appreciation of the Malaysia currency, making the economy less attractive.  
This led to the pegging of the currency against only the dollar. 
4. Effects of State Activism on the Economy 
The number of SOEs increased from 22 in 1960 to 1,010 in 1985.236   Within the 
first ten years of OPP, the average annual growth rate of the manufacturing sector was in 
excesses of 10%, declining to 4.9% between 1981 and 1985.  By 1985, the sector 
contributed 19.7% of the GDP, up from 13% in 1970.237  Agriculture declined from 40% 
to 20.8% in the corresponding period.238  The relative success in state intervention was 
due to the limiting of the state’s involvement to the shortest possible time, 
commercialization of such projects early in the scheme and a focus on exports.  
Furthermore, success was guaranteed by the competency of the bureaucracy, the 
complimentary relationship of the bureaucracy and the political class, and the political 
structure of the state which did not facilitate fractionalization 
G. THE 1986 -2000 ERA 
Between 1986 and 1996, the state reversed of some of the policies of NEP in 
favor of more neo-liberal approach, marking a tacit end to the development state policies 
of OPP.  Some SOEs were privatized while the Investment Promotion Act was adopted in 
1986 to further encourage foreign investment.  The reversal was in response to the 
economic recession of the early 1980s and the attendant capital flight, which exposed the 
economy’s weaknesses: vulnerability to the world market price of oil and other 
commodities, uncompetitive local industries, and high government expenditure due to 
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inadequate private sector contribution to the economy.239  The exercise was based on the 
belief that privatization would promote competition, enhance efficiency, stimulate private 
entrepreneurship and reduce abuses inherent in SOEs.  
1. Public Sector Reform 
The privatization exercise entailed the restructuring of the public sector, 
commercialization, privatization and deregulation of SOE and some social services. For 
instance, services such as packaging and garbage disposal, which hitherto were public 
services, were contracted out under the program.240 Furthermore, telecommunications, air 
and road transport, and power generation were deregulated to allow private sector 
participation.  The privatization of Pernas and management buy-out of MARA were the 
high points of the privatization effort and an indication of the government’s commitment 
to the exercise. The instruments of privatization included management buy-outs, sale of 
government equity, and build, operate and transfer (BOT). BOT entailed private sector 
conception, building, and operation of some services or projects for a number of years to 
recover their expenditure after which ownership is handed over to the state. 
The reform of the civil service was premised of weaknesses and corruption in the 
bureaucracy.  Incidences of bribery of state officials, kickbacks and award of contracts to 
the politically connected and kiths and kin were rampart.  This was in spite of measures 
to strengthen the civil service through inculcation of ethical practices and universal 
values and anti-corruption measures of ACA and AGO.241  The ACA and AGO 
undermined the effort focusing primarily on petty corruption, leaving the elite and 
politically connected relatively free from investigation and prosecution.  For instance, of 
the 939 arrests made by ACA between 1996 and 2000, 13 were politicians, 77 top 
management personnel while 810 were support personnel.242  
By 1994, the work force of the state had been reduced by about 97,000 personnel 
while about RM10.8 billion was generated from the sale of government equity in 
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SOEs.243  Similarly, the private sector expended RM8.2 billion on infrastructural 
development under the BOT, while the state reduced its debt burden with the transfer of 
about RM7.45 billion to the private sector.244  One of the most significant outcomes of 
the program was the number of investments and quality of services provided by the 
private sector in the telecommunication and transport sector.  For example, the average 
turn around time at the Kelang Port Container Terminal (KCT) declined from 11.7 hours 
to 8.9 hours within two years of its privatization. In addition, the efficiency gains of KCT 
increased by 53% while the revenue of Malaysia Airlines Bhd (MAS) and Sports Toto 
(former SOEs) rose by 22% and 11% respectively.245  The privatization effort 
contributed to the growth of the Malaysian capital market and the strength of the Kuala 
Lumpur Stock Exchange, which became the largest stock market in South East Asia and 
the forth largest in Asia.   
While privatization enhanced the profitability of most of the companies and the 
country at large, the privatization process also transferred state monopolies to politically 
connected private investors.246  Thus, a serving finance minister acquired a 10% stake in 
TV3, a privately owned television company granted license to operate, the gaming 
company Sports Toto came under the control of protégés of the royal family, and Pan 
Malaysian Sweeps Sdn Bhd was awarded to a close associate of the prime minister.  State 
ownership remained high as well.  As of 1995, the state held 77% of Tenaga Nasional 
Bhd (TNB), and a 75% stake in Syarikat Telekom Malaysia Bhd (STM), a 
telecommunication enterprise and Petroliam Nasional, a petroleum enterprise.  It is 
obvious in this case that profitability and patronage resulted in growth, in contrast to what 
was obtained elsewhere.   
Unlike in SSA, the government had conceived privatization of SOEs before the 
BWI encouragement.  This was premised on the prime minister’s belief that privatization 
would eliminate the subsidy mentality among Malays and his desire to make the 
Malaysia enterprise internationally competitive.  Given this desire and the UNMO 
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hegemony and previous practices, it suggests that SOEs were sold to investors capable of 
achieving this goal.  Moreover, the antecedents suggest that the goal of balancing the 
Chinese economic strength served to ensure the investments remain profitable.  
2. Private Sector Promotion 
The enactment of the Investment Promotion Act in 1986 signified a renewed 
effort to encourage foreign capital. This followed the adoption of multi-national 
company-led export-oriented manufacturing prevalent among the South East Asian 
countries.  The Act eliminated the application of the NEP and ICA requirements for 
industries involved in exports, and domestic investments with less than RM1 million 
shareholder capitals.247   The high point of the effort was the liberalization of ownership 
and tax regulation of all firms, both foreign and domestic.  This resulted in average 
growth of 6.4% by 1992, and achievement of full employment in 1993.248    
With the economy at full employment, the New Development Policy of 1993 
shifted the focus to capital-intensive manufacturing to facilitate competitiveness of local 
industries and reduce the cost of production. The policy sought to increase the amount of 
local content in foreign-owned export manufacturing, while advancing the level of 
technology of local and foreign firms. These objectives were facilitated by organizations 
like the Human Resource Development Corporation.  The corporation enhanced local 
manpower development through the establishment of vocational and industrial training 
centers.  Furthermore, the Malaysian Industrial Development Authority (MIDA) 
restructured the tax system, reducing tax exemption from 100% to 60% for firms meeting 
stringent requirements on technology content and sharing as a means of improving 
linkage between foreign and local firms.249   The requirement included a minimum 
capital investment per employee of RM55,000, research and development expenditure of 
1% of sales within three years of production, and 7% of employees with certificate or 
diploma in technical fields.   
The most ambitious incentives were offered by the Multi-media Development 
Corporation (MDC), established in 1996, which created and managed a multimedia 
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corridor consisting of the university and incentives to firms located in the corridor.  
However, the impact of these measures has not redressed the gap between available labor 
and requirements of foreign enterprises.  These efforts to increase the skill of human 
capital to meet the challenges of capital-intensive enterprises have been limited by earlier 
failure to invest in primary and secondary education.  This was due to the pursuit of 
Malay traditional-centered education, which does not stress mathematics, science and 
English education.  Moreover, gains in the education sector have favored a small number 
of elite at the expense of the majority of the populace.250   
The long-term effects of the First NAP on agriculture began manifesting during 
this period.  The policy continued to aim at maximizing income from agriculture through 
efficient utilization of the state’s resources and increasing productivity through land 
development and support services.251  The most important hindrances to the attainment of 
the goals included labor shortages, increasing wages and the state’s preference for 
manufacturing.252  Consequently, the policy was reviewed and the Second NAP adopted 
a new focus on competitiveness, efficiency and linkage between agriculture and the 
manufacturing sector.  It primarily focused on small-scale farmers.  Import taxes on 
agricultural products were reduced while export of value added was encouraged.  
3. Effects of the Policy on the Economy 
Manufacturing share of GDP increased from 25% in 1990 to 35% in 2000, while 
agricultural share declined from 18% to 8% within the same period.253  Foreign direct 
investment increased initially from $2.332 million in 1990 to $5.136 million in 1997, 
before declining to $1.552 million in 1999.254  The decline was due to the financial crisis 
of 1997 which resulted in capital flight. In addition, the vulnerability of the economy, 
corruption, controls on capital and inadequate technical skills resulted in the loss of  
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competitive attractiveness and investor confidence.   Efforts to redress the shortcomings 
in skill capabilities and investment drive were barely adequate to sustain the 
achievements of earlier years. 
H. CONCLUSION 
Malaysia adopted a predominantly liberal economy with limited state intervention 
after independence.  The economy successfully transitioned from a producer of primary 
goods to an exporter of intermediate products driven by foreign capital.  The government 
encouraged ISI initially and later adopted EOI to boost industrialization and developed a 
rural infrastructure to boost agricultural production.  The policies resulted in substantial 
growth in the agricultural and industrial sectors.  However, the dependence of the 
economy on foreign capital and its exposure to swings in the prices of primary produce in 
the international market resulted in greater state intervention to promote diversification of 
the economy.  This was facilitated by the accrual of sufficient public capital in the 
previous period. The implementation of the policies in the immediate years of 
independence reflected a relative absence of patronage, while intervention led to the 
introduction of patronage. The state adopted a mix of neo-liberal and development state 
policies in steering the economy. Between 1956 and 1970, its intervention in the 
economy was indirect providing the relevant infrastructure to encourage private sector 
participation, while it took active direct intervention in the next period.  This broadened 
the productive base and resulted in tremendous growth.  This was facilitated by EOI 
which reduced its dependence on the export of agricultural produce, as this proved 
successful in the interim.  Although, the intervention introduced patronage and patron-
client networks into the polity, it did not undermine economic development.    
The broadening of the productive base was facilitated by state-led mechanisms in 
the agricultural and industrial sectors.  In particular, the diversification of agricultural 
production to include oil palm production was only attainable by virtue of state 
intervention given the fact that the market would most logically exploit the advantages in 
rubber production. Likewise, the inherent weaknesses in skills and domestic capital 
would certainly have favored agricultural production rather than manufacturing.  This, 
however, became the reverse as state intervention resulted in the development and growth 
of the manufacturing sector. These successes were dependent on the design of the 
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mechanisms which were market friendly, and reduced the burden of dependence on the 
state.  Concern on competitiveness and efficiency of erstwhile SOEs led to the adoption 
of neo-liberal policies.  While this was successful, the Asian financial crisis exposed the 
dependence of the economy to international shocks and inherent weaknesses in the 
domestic capabilities.  Within the three distinct periods, none of the approaches in and of 
itself was adequate to grow the economy; rather, growth was facilitated by the right mix 















This thesis was motivated by the differences between the BWI and AU/African 
specialists on how economic policies within the region should be structured in the light of 
the acceptance of neo-liberalism by African leaders.  While the AU/African specialists 
are more disposed to improved planning and management, the BWI remain favorably 
disposed to economic openness.  This thesis sought to examine if improved planning and 
management, further opening of the economy, or a nuance combination of both result in 
sustained economic growth and development.  The policies of the state and its effect on 
the economy in Nigeria, Botswana and Malaysia were examined vis-à-vis the arguments 
of the two approaches.  While, the opening of the market ensures growth, it was unable to 
diversify the productive base.  Likewise, improved planning and management facilitated 
a broadening of the productive base, but the investments that often resulted were unable 
to grow substantially without opening of the market. Examination reveals that neither of 
the two approaches alone resulted in economic development; instead, growth resulted 
through the adoption of a blend of both.   
In Nigeria, ISI and state intervention in agriculture resulted in a decline in the 
performance of these sectors in the long-term, and neo-liberal policies did not result in 
balanced growth in Botswana, but rather deepened the dependence on the export of 
primary products.  Conversely, ISI resulted in sustainable growth in Malaysia.  In 
addition, while neo-liberalism deepened the dependence on export of primary export 
commodity in Malaysia, growth was facilitated by state intervention and not the market.  
On the other hand, the efficacy of neo-liberalism was uneven in the agricultural and 
industrial sectors in the three cases.  While it resulted in improved performance in the 
agricultural sector in Nigeria and Botswana, its performance in the industrial sector in all 
three cases was doubtful.  Neo-liberalism ultimately resulted in the market maximizing 
the short-term potential of the economy, while intervention enabled the state to shape the 
economy in ways that latent potentials could be created and exploited.   It is evident form 
all three cases that neither neo-liberalism nor state-led development by itself is sufficient 
to stimulate economic growth and development given the inherent weaknesses in 
underdeveloped economies thus, necessitating a blend of the two approaches.     
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From the studies on Nigeria and Malaysia, it is apparent that the involvement of 
the state in marketing and provision of subsidies breeds avenues for corruption, reduces 
incentives for rural farmers, and ultimately causes a decline in agricultural production.  
On the other hand, the provision of infrastructural facilities, extension services and 
necessary inputs and materials enhanced production during the SAP in Nigeria, facilitated 
oil palm and rubber production in Malaysia, and boosted cattle production in Botswana.   
The sustainability of state institutions in Malaysia and Botswana was due to the 
commercial focus and time limitation on support to private investments.   This resulted in 
shifting the sources of rents away from the state to the market, and guaranteed the 
sustainability of the institutions and project long-term.  Furthermore, state involvement in 
the establishment of farms facilitated the diversification from rubber to oil palm 
production, beyond the expectation of the market. Similarly, though relatively successful, 
Malaysia’s intervention in rice production ensured that production for the domestic 
market and economic empowerment of the Malays were met.   
In all three cases, the liberalization of the sector and determination of prices by 
market forces encouraged rural farmers to boost production.  Nevertheless, the success 
achieved in Malaysia suggests that when the private sector is reluctant or unable to 
broaden the agricultural base, the state is capable of achieving this through mechanisms 
that do not encourage dependence on agriculture. Thus, while the analysis suggests that 
state involvement in production or marketing might hinder increased agricultural 
production, state involvement might be necessary to direct or shift the productive base to 
other produce if it absolutely becomes necessary due to risks and cost to private capital.   
The issue is not just whether or not the state should be involved in the economy, but 
where and how.  
Equally obvious is the fact that increasing production in agriculture is insufficient 
to ensure that maximum benefits are derived by the state and investors.  This was evident 
in the export of cattle and oil palm in Botswana and Malaysia, respectively, which 
generated multi-fold profits to investors and significant foreign exchange for the state.  In 
both instances, export was facilitated by the maintenance of a competitive exchange 
regime, while added value in Malaysia was achieved by the linkage of the agricultural 
and industrial sectors of the economy through state action.  Conversely, in Nigeria 
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artificially valuing the local currency disincentivized exports.  Similarly, pegging the 
local currency at a low value, though beneficial in the interim, could have negative 
consequences in the long run as was observed in Malaysia. This calls for a strong state’s 
role when the currency exchange tends to have an opposite effect on exports.  However, 
its prevailing value is best determined by the market, while the state intervenes only 
when it becomes absolutely necessary.   
Given the poor linkage between the agricultural and industrial sector in all three 
cases in the years after independence, it is obvious that the market alone is insufficient 
and incapable of bridging inherent gaps. Although structural adjustment facilitated the 
utilization of local agricultural resources in the industrial sector in Nigeria short-term, its 
non-sustainability long- term revealed the inadequacies of market forces due to 
competing demands for export and local consumption.  In Malaysia, however, the tariff 
regime ensured the gap between the agricultural and industrial sector was reasonably 
reduced while the EOI guaranteed its sustainability in the long run.  To this extent, 
therefore, both the state and market forces have a role to facilitate agricultural production.    
ISI programs proved inadequate and inappropriate to achieve economic growth in 
both Nigeria and Malaysia, while for Botswana, close proximity to South Africa and the 
weaknesses of the domestic market hampered industrial growth. However, the adoption 
of EOI tremendously impacted economic growth and revealed the lapses inherent in ISI.  
Thus, EOI is a necessity for economic growth, and must be fashioned by the state in ways 
that it meets its interests as was the case in Malaysia.  Considering the effects of SAP on 
industrialization in Nigeria, the liberalization of the economy based on an ISI strategy 
would lead to a decline in productivity because of low comparative advantages in the 
local economy.  However, judging from the successes in EOI in Malaysia, there must be 
a clear-cut objective on what the state seeks to achieve with industrialization.  In 
Malaysia, the state utilized ISI to satisfy local consumption while using EOI to generate 
foreign exchange for the state.  Moreover, efficiency, improved productivity and 
competitiveness were guiding principles in both strategies.  To this extent, tariff regimes 
must seek to protect those industries under ISI.  However, the tariff regime must be 
dynamic to stimulate a gradual exposure of production of low-end goods and services to 
competition and gear investors towards moving into the next stage of production.  Thus, 
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it must not protect industries indefinitely.  Similarly, given the competing needs for 
export and industrial use evident in Nigeria and role of the government in facilitating the 
use of local raw materials in Malaysia, a balance must be struck between these two needs.  
However, because the private sector is largely involved in both instances, the state is the 
most appropriate institution to coordinate and regulate the needs of the sectors. 
The relative success achieved in Malaysia, and to a lesser extent in Botswana, was 
due to the direct intervention of each government in specific sectors.  However, the 
differences between the processes in these countries were in the form of the interventions.  
In Malaysia and Botswana, intervention was market-friendly with measures adopted to 
enhance inherent potentials which could be exploited maximally by the market within the 
shortest possible time, while the reverse was the case in Nigeria.  Malaysia 
commercialized such investments from inception, ensured a communal buy-in and sold to 
the private sector. In Botswana, the state granted loans, entrepreneurial and management 
training to private investors who chose their investments.  Either way, the government 
avoided prolonged involvement in the projects and shifted the rents from accruing to the 
government to returning to the investment.  In this regard, the state would be necessary to 
steer industrialization to areas not too unattractive to the private sector, with reasonable 
chances of successes and sustainability and with short-term public support.   
For Botswana, much of the success achieved was dependent on the bureaucracy 
and its relationship within the polity.  While independent in posture, the Botswana 
bureaucracy was equally competent in its responsibilities to the state.  On the other hand, 
the same cannot be said of the bureaucracy in Nigeria.  In Nigeria, the bureaucracy was 
weak, hijacked and connived with the political class and elite to appropriate state 
resources for personal benefit, contributing to decline in economic performance.  
Conversely, the bureaucracy in Malaysia was fairly competent and had a close 
relationship with the political class in Malaysia which fostered positive accumulation and 
utilization of rents for national interest. This suggests that the competency and nature of 
the relationship between the bureaucracy and political class matters.  Nigeria’s undue 
preference given to indigenous participation in spite of weak institutional capability and 
competing ethnic needs and lack of a unifying purpose resulted in patronage.  While 
patronage might be difficult to eliminate and did not undermine growth, as evident from 
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the result of the privatization exercise in Malaysia, avenues which booster or lend 
credence to patronage must be reduced substantially as in the result in Nigeria under 
NEEDS.  Furthermore, given the differences in the effect of patronage in Nigeria and 
Malaysia, a unifying purpose needs to be instituted among the various ethnic groups and 
business/political class.  Equally revealing is the result of the shift of the sources of rents 
from the state to the private sector. It is certain that privatization does not necessarily 
reduce patronage.   
Finally, given the spate of illegalities that bedeviled the financial and monetary 
sector in Nigeria and the result of NEED, it behooves the state to be capable of 
performing supervisory roles efficiently and effectively in the economy.  This calls for 
the institutionalization of a competent civil service, an insight supported by the capacity 
and professionalism of the bureaucracy in Botswana.  Furthermore, considering the 
effects of tariffs and monetary regulations on the competitiveness of the economy, the 
role of the state as a facilitator of growth cannot be under-estimated.  Also, given that 
privatization in Malaysia resulted in private monopoly, the seeming connivance between 
the bureaucracy and the business class can be undermined by resorting to a fully 
liberalized economy with multiple players in various sectors of the economy.   
From all the case studies, neither the state-led development nor neo-liberal 
policies by itself are sufficient to guarantee growth in the agricultural and industrial 
sectors in particular, and the economy in general.   A blend of the two approaches would 
certainly stimulate economic growth and development; this suggests that the neo-
liberal/development state debate is largely a false one. 
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